The Role of Institutional Review Boards in Protecting Human Subjects: Are We Really Ready to Fix a Broken System? by Beh, Hazel Glenn
LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW
Volume 26 Spring 2002
THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS IN
PROTECTING HUMAN SUBJECTS: ARE WE REALLY READY
TO FIX A BROKEN SYSTEM?
Hazel Glenn Beh *
I. INTRODUCTION
The history of human subject research has been characterized "as one
of 'progress propelled by scandal."" This depiction seems accurate in
light of past research atrocities in modem history including the Tuskegee
Syphilis Study conducted from 1932 until 1972, the intentional exposure
of soldiers and Navaho miners to radiation in the 1940s and 1950s, the
LSD experiments secretly conducted on American soldiers by the Army
and the CIA in the 1950s and 1960s, the Japanese military's "plague
bomb" experiments during World War II, and the typhus experiments
conducted at Buchenwald concentration camp. Although such abuses
were thought to be relegated to the past, recent research tragedies have
again focused the spotlight on human subject research.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland recently issued the landmark de-
cision of Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc.,2 involving human
subject research on children, which has shaken the research community.
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1. Mary R. Anderlik & Nanette Elster, Lawsuits Against IRBs: Accountability or Incongru-
it),?, 29 J.U MED. & ETHiCS 220, 222 (2001) (quoting Ruth Faden & Tom Beauchamp, Removing
'Deficiencies' in Human Research, BALT. SUN, Mar. 5, 2000, at C3).
2. 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001 ).
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The court reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Kennedy
Krieger Institute, an affiliate of the prestigious Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity, and remanded the case for trial to consider whether it was liable to
low-income children and their families who participated as human sub-
jects in a lead paint poisoning study it conducted.3 This decision went
much further, however, and the vastness of the court's rulings will likely
force all researchers and Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) 4 involved in
human subject research to take note.
The court's comments about the research design were unrestrained
and must have surely embarrassed and stung Kennedy Krieger, the Johns
Hopkins Institutional Review Board, and the particular researchers in-
volved. For example, the court noted that because this study involved
experiments on vulnerable subjects, it "present[ed] similar problems" but
differed significantly from some of the most notorious and egregious
instances of human subject research abuses in modem history.5 Yet,
however large the dissimilarities, modem research institutions do not
want to be included in such a list of research atrocities.6 In response to
the court's comparison, which was "widely repeated in the local and na-
tional press,"7 Kennedy Krieger complained:
The resulting firestorm of criticism, shock, embarrassment, and
inflammatory publicity in the public press has been enormously
unfair to an institution with an outstanding record dedicated to
helping children, especially poor children, with serious medical
problems. What Kennedy Krieger and its dedicated scientists
sought to do here bears no resemblance whatsoever to the atro-
cious examples of study participants being affirmatively poi-
soned and/or intentionally deceived about the availability and
appropriateness of medical attention.
8
Kennedy Krieger is not the sole institution facing criticism regarding
3. Id.
4. Established by the federal system, these boards were created and designed solely to pro-
tect human subjects from research abuse by ensuring that the research was ethically designed to
include minimal risks and fairly balanced with potential benefits as well as to guarantee that sub-
ject participation is informed and voluntary. Id. at 813.
5. Id. at 816-17 (mentioning the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, the radiation studies, the LSD
experiments, the Japanese military's "plague bomb" studies, and the typhus experiments conducted
at Buchenwald concentration camp).
6. A concurring judge distanced herself from the court's resolution of issues beyond the
scope of the question presented and the court's adoption of the Nuremberg Code into state law and
declined to "join in the majority's comparisons between the research at issue in [the] case and
extreme historical abuses, such as those of the Nazis or the Tuskegee Syphilis Study." Id. at 858-61
(Raker, J., concurring in result only).
7. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., Appellee's Motion for Partial Reconsideration and
Modification of Opinion, (Sept. 17, 2001), available at
http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/press/200l/SEPTEMBER/kennedykriegermotion.htm
8. Id.
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research abuse involving human subjects. In fact, as a result of recent,
well-publicized incidents that led to the deaths of several human sub-
jects, there is plenty of embarrassment to go around in the scientific
community.9 Because much of the criticism arising from these recent
scandals has been lodged not only against the researchers but also against
the local Institutional Review Boards that approved the research initially,
national attention has highlighted the failings of these boards that were
designed to protect human subjects.
By analyzing the impact of the Grimes decision and evaluating the
current problems underlying the IRB system as well as the federal regu-
lations designed to protect research subjects, the Article demonstrates the
need for immediate reform. Part II discusses Grimes, looking at the
court's description of the protocol, the consent process, and the per-
ceived flaws in each, as well as its harsh criticism directed at the IRB.
Although the case has been remanded,' ° the court's commentary regard-
ing human subject research, particularly the involvement of children in
such research, is landmark. More importantly, the court carved out a sig-
nificant and long-neglected judicial role in the oversight of this form of
research. In Part III, the Article outlines the responsibilities of IRBs un-
der the federal system and addresses how they protect subjects from un-
ethical research. By describing a few ethical lapses that have recently
occurred at several prestigious institutions, Part IV suggests that IRBs
have failed to adequately protect human subjects. While Part V discusses
the growing criticism that the current system designed to protect human
subjects is broken and in need of substantial reform, Part VI comments
on the recent recommendations for reform issued by the National Bio-
ethics Advisory Commission. Among its many recommendations, the
blue ribbon panel suggested more independent methods of review, in-
creased guidance, education, and resources directed toward the IRB sys-
tem, as well as the implementation of certification and accreditation sys-
tems." The Article concludes by noting that reforms are no longer the
sole jurisdiction of federal policy makers. As Grimes and the spate of
recent lawsuits against other research institutions have made clear, re-
form will come, if not by legislation and rulemaking, then by judicial
fiat.
9. See discussion infr-a Part IV.
10. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 861.
II. NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN
RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS vii (Aug. 2001), available at
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/human/overvoll.pdf [hereinafter NBAC, ETHICAL AND
POLICY ISSUES).
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II. GRIMES V. KENNEDY KRIEGER INSTITUTE, INC.
In 1993, the Environmental Protection Agency awarded a research
study grant to Kennedy Krieger Institute, a well-regarded research insti-
tution affiliated with Johns Hopkins University.12 Entitled "Evaluation of
Efficacy of Residential Lead Based Paint Repair and Maintenance Inter-
ventions," the purpose of the study was "to characterize and compare the
short and long-term efficacy of comprehensive lead-paint abatement and
less costly and potentially more cost-effective Repair and Maintenance
interventions for reducing levels of lead in residential house dust which
in turn should reduce lead in children's blood."' 3
A. The Study Design
Lead paint poses health risks to humans and to children in particular
since exposure impairs the cognitive and physical development of young
children. 14 Lead poisoning affects nearly one million children in the
United States, 15 and in fact, lead paint toxicity constitutes "one of the top
environmental hazards facing children under age six.' 16 Because minor-
ity and poor children tend to reside in older, poorly maintained homes
built prior to 1978,17 they are especially vulnerable. 18 As paint deterio-
rates, "it chips and peels, making it easily accessible for children to chew
and to ingest .. .[and] create[s] lead dust that will deposit on a child's
toys, hands, or food."'19
Completely eradicating lead paint from contaminated rental units is
extremely costly. 20 Thus, because landlords face potential civil liability
for renting houses contaminated with lead,21 in some instances, they de-
cide simply to abandon the property, leaving it vacant rather than under-
12. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 819.
13. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. Id. ("Lead poisoning poses a distinct danger to young children. It adversely affects cogni-
tive development, growth, and behavior. Extremely high levels have been known to result in sei-
zures, coma, and even death.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Kara Kurtzman Daghlian, Lead-Based Paint: The Crisis Still Facing Our Nation's Poor
and Minority Children, 9 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 535, 535 (2001) (citing Hous. and Urban
Dev., at http://www.hud.gov:80/lea/leapboff.html#serious).
16. Id. at 536.
17. The use of lead paint in homes was prohibited in 1978. Verne A. Pedro, Note, Still Hazy
After All These Years: New York City's Local Law 38 and the Legislative Debate over Landlord
Liability in Lead Paint Poisoning Cases, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 541, 554 (2000).
18. Daghlian, supra note 15, at 538.
19. Id. at 538-39.
20. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 821.
21. To understand the development of landlord tort liability for lead paint poisoning in Mary-
land courts, see Brown v. Dermer, 744 A.2d 47 (Md. 2000); Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson,
645 A.2d 1147 (Md. 1994); Scroggins v. Dahne, 645 A.2d 1160 (Md. 1994); Bartholomee v. Ca-
sey, 651 A.2d 908 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
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take expensive rehabilitation efforts.22 Despite the dangers associated
with lead paint, federal laws aimed at reducing contamination in older
homes have not been altogether successful in decreasing exposure.23 In
addition to lead paint dust in older homes caused by flaking paint, chil-
dren face other exposure because lead may be concentrated in soil, pipes,
and solder.24
In light of the large number of homes containing lead hazards, Ken-
nedy Krieger planned a study to determine a safe and inexpensive
method to remove sufficient lead so to prevent dangerous exposure to
children. 25 The study was conducted in Baltimore and the experimental
arm involved the use of older low-income rental units containing lead
paint.26 The study was comprised of five groups consisting of twenty-five
houses each.27 Under the research protocol, researchers sought houses
that were "structurally sound" and that were either built prior to 1941 or
"had documented lead based paint" present to qualify in the first three
test groups. 28 Each of the first three groups of houses received grants or
loans for different levels of repair and maintenance aimed at reducing
lead paint.29 Level one houses received $1,650 intended to cover a
"minimal level of repair and maintenance, 30 Level two received $3,500
intended to cover "a greater level of repair and maintenance,"3 t and
Level three houses received between $6,000 and $7,000 to spend on "an
even greater level of repair and maintenance. 32 Groups four and five
22. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 821.
23. See. e.g.. Daghlian, supra note 15, at 539-45 (discussing the weaknesses in federal legis-
lation dealing with lead-based paint hazards).
24. Id. at 535-36.
25. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 819.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 820.
28. /d. at 822-23.
29. Id. Kennedy Krieger assisted landlords in applying for grants and loans for abatement.
Grimes, 782 A.2d at 821; see also Daghlian, supra note 15, at 541-43 (describing the Residential
Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992 ("Title X"), Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3897,
and its efforts to alleviate lead-based paint dangers through monetary grants to qualifying appli-
cants).
30. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 821-22.
Repair & Maintenance Level I interventions were capped ... at $1,650 and included
wet-scraping of peeling and flaking lead-based paint and paint of unknown composi-
tion on all interior surfaces, including walls, trim, and doors; repainting of treated
surfaces; installation of window well caps; repainting of all exterior window trim,
repainting of all interior window sills; vacuuming of all horizontal surfaces and win-
dow components with a high efficiency particulate (HEPA) vacuum; and wet clean-
ing all horizontal surfaces.
d. at 822.
31. Id. "Level 11 interventions were capped ...at $3,500 and included all the elements of
Level I intervention plus two key additional elements: use of sealants and paints to make floors
smoother and more easily cleanable, and in-place window and door treatments to reduce abrasion
of lead-painted surfaces." Id.
32. Id. "Level III interventions were capped ... at S6,000-S7,000 and added window re-
placement and encapsulation of exterior door trim with aluminum, and the use of coverings on
some floors and stairs to make them smooth and more easily climbable." Grimes, 782 A.2d at 822.
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constituted control groups.33 Group four consisted of houses that were
already abated and received no additional repair and maintenance,34
whereas Group five contained modem homes built after 1980 when lead
paint was no longer used. 31 Of ethical significance, both vacant and oc-
cupied properties were included in the study, and vacant homes received
the highest level of abatement because of the ease of abatement and re-
36pair.
Kennedy Krieger maintained that it "knew that all three tiers of in-
tervention reduced lead dust by approximately 80% from that found in
untreated properties. ' 37 It further asserted that "[t]he Study was designed
so that every participating family in every category of housing would
have the opportunity to live in safer housing than 95% of the non-lead
abated housing stock in Baltimore City-and safer than required by then-
federal, state or local law.,
38
The human subjects enrolled in the study were the children of fami-
lies that rented homes.39 Notably, some children were already living in
the rental units identified to the experiment, but in some instances, the
families moved into the properties during the study.40 The court's deci-
sion indicates that some of the properties with lead contamination were
vacant and not on the market until they became part of the study.4' In
fact, the landlords participating in the study actually recruited the chil-
dren by consenting to allow their property to be used for the study and
agreeing to attempt to rent to families with young children.42 According
to the court, "[t]he project required that small children be present in the
33. Id.
34. Id. The level of abatement in Groups I through 3 was apparently less than complete. See
Appellee's Motion for Partial Reconsideration and Modification of Opinion, supra note 7, at n.4.
35. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 822.
36. See id. at 821-23. As a result, it can be inferred that contaminated properties that were not
on the market at the time the study began had to be placed back into the rental market. Vacant
properties were more often assigned Level Ill or Level II abatement (2:1 ratio). Id. at 823 n.19.
KKI explained its method for assigning abatement levels:
About half of the R&M Properties [Groups I through 3] were occupied before the
improvements to the R&M Properties were made. The first group of homes were
[sic] occupied by the same families before and after the improvements. Approxi-
mately one half of the second group of homes were [sic] occupied by the same fami-
lies before and after the improvements. None of the third group of homes was [sic]
occupied when the improvements were performed. The highest level of abatement
was done in the third level of homes, i.e., the non-occupied residences, because va-
cancy allowed more abatement to be done safely.
Lead-Based Paint Study, available at
http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/press/200l/SEPTEMBER/leadfactsheet.htm (Sept. 7, 2001)
[hereinafter Lead-Based Paint Study].
37. Lead-Based Paint Study, supra note 36.
38. Id.
39. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 82 1.
40. See Lead-Based Paint Study, supra note 36; see also Grimes, 782 A.2d at 821-23.
41. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 826-27 nn.24-25.
42. Id. at 821.
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houses. To facilitate that purpose, the landlords agreeing to permit their
properties to be included in the studies were encouraged, if not required,
to rent the properties to tenants who had young children. 43 In return,
Kennedy Krieger helped landlords apply for and receive grants or loans
for lead abatement to their properties.44
Researchers recruited occupant families with at least one child be-
tween the age of five months and forty-eight months old.45 Exclusion
criteria included mental retardation, physical handicaps, sickle cell ane-
mia, and likelihood of relocation prior to the study's termination. 46 Par-
ents consented on behalf of their children and agreed to submit them to
blood testing as often as eight to nine times in two years, to allow their
home to be tested for lead as many as eight to nine times over two years,
and to answer questionnaires every six months throughout the duration of
the study.47 In return, the parents were paid five dollars to complete the
initial questionnaire and to allow testing of the home and an additional
fifteen dollars for each questionnaire that was fully completed.48
The research design required the researchers to measure lead dust
levels in the houses and lead blood levels in the children over a period of
two years. 49 Kennedy Krieger measured lead paint within the houses by
utilizing an experimental method of capturing dust samples through the
use of a "cyclone vacuum" as well as a traditional "dust wipe" method.
50
In addition, it conducted exterior soil and drinking water measure-
ments.5 ' Researchers also drew blood from the children involved in the
study on a regular schedule and subsequently reported the results to par-
ents.52
The Johns Hopkins University Joint Committee on Clinical Investi-
gation, the institution's IRB, questioned the study as first proposed. 3 In
particular, it expressed concern that the use of healthy control children in
modern urban housing was impermissible under federal regulations. 4
The IRB was initially concerned that the non-therapeutic use of control
subjects posed a problem, and in response, it suggested changes to the
consent form's identification of benefits in order to conform to federal
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 823.
46. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 823.
47. Id. at 824.
48. Id. at 824-25.
49. Id. at 820-21.
50. Id. at 828 n.26. Kennedy Krieger explained that the wipe method constitutes a recognized
method of measuring lead dust, but the cyclone vacuum method had not been scientifically ac-
cepted. Lead-Based Paint Study, supra note 36.
51. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 822.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 814.
54. I.
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regulations:
The next issue has to do with drawing blood from the control
population, namely children growing up in modem urban hous-
ing. Federal guidelines are really quite specific regarding using
children as controls in projects in which there is no potential
benefit [to the particular children]. To call a subject a normal
control is to indicate that there is no real benefit to be received
[by the particular children] . . . . So we think it would be much
more acceptable to indicate that the "control group" is being
studied to determine what exposure outside the home may play in
a total lead exposure; thereby, indicating that these control indi-
viduals are gaining some benefit, namely learning whether safe
housing alone is sufficient to keep the blood-lead levels in ac-
ceptable bounds. We suggest that you modify.., consent form[s]
... accordingly."
The IRB eventually approved a modified consent form that reflected
that all children would receive certain benefits.56 After stating the level
of compensation, the form explained that Kennedy Krieger agreed to
"provide [the parents] with specific blood-lead results," to discuss the
results of the tests performed on the house, and to explain measures that
could be taken to guard against the risks of lead exposure.57 Although
modified, the consent form was not well drafted by any standard. For
example, the benefits section identified compensation for completion of
the questionnaires as a benefit.58 Compensation, however, provides an
incentive for participation and is not considered a benefit associated with
the research.5 9 This section also included information explaining the
steps Kennedy Krieger would take to ensure privacy. 6° Rather than a
benefit, loss of privacy constitutes a risk, and the safeguards the re-
searchers agreed to implement to protect privacy are typically described
in order to explain how that risk will be minimized.6'
The court approached the case as if the research was non-
therapeutic, 62 and its holdings and discussion flow from that assump-
55. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 824-25.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, IRB GUIDEBOOK ch. 3 pt. A (1993), avail-
able at http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/irb/irb_chapter3.htm#e7 [hereinafter IRB GUIDEBOOK] ("Di-
rect payments or other forms of remuneration offered to potential subjects as an incentive or re-
ward for participation should not be considered a 'benefit' to be gained from research.").
60. Consent Form (on file with the author).
61. IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 59, at ch. 3 pt. G ("In behavioral, social, and some biomedi-
cal research, the methods for gathering information may pose the added risk of invasion of privacy
and possible violations of confidentiality.").
62. To gain a further understanding of therapeutic as well as non-therapeutic research, see
Charles Weijer, The Ethical Analysis of Risk, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 344, 347 (2000); see also
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tion.63 Although the court initially stated that "there was absolutely no
such [therapeutic] value of the research in respect to the minor subjects
used to measure the effectiveness of the study," 64 it clarified in its order
denying reconsideration that "[e]very issue bearing on liability or dam-
ages remain[ed] open for further factual development," including
"whether the study in question offered some benefit, and therefore could
be regarded as therapeutic in nature, or involved more than that minimal
risk is open for further factual development on remand., 65 Thus, on re-
mand, the defendants may still be able to establish that all children in-
volved in the study received therapeutic benefits.
The court harshly criticized the IRB's involvement in labeling
health monitoring as a benefit, explaining that "the IRB . . . abdicated
that responsibility, instead suggesting to the researchers a way to miscast
the characteristics of the study in order to avoid the responsibility inher-
ent in non-therapeutic research involving children. 66 The IRB's com-
ments do not indicate whether the protocol was actually changed at the
suggestion of the IRB to provide education and monitoring information
to the parents or whether the IRB merely suggested that the protocol
identify the education and blood and house tests as benefits.
The court further concluded that the IRB "had a partial mispercep-
tion of the difference between therapeutic and non-therapeutic research
ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 6-8 (1981). Whether the
therapeutic/non-therapeutic distinction is appropriate under the federal regulations or was correctly
characterized in this case is subject to controversy. Loretta Kopelman, Pediatric Research Regula-
tions Under Legal Scrutiny: Grimes Narrows Their Interpretation, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 38, 41
(2002) (noting that many protocols have both therapeutic and non-therapeutic aspects, andthere-
fore, the distinction is not particularly useful). The children involved in the study were theoreti-
cally "at risk" of lead exposure because they were in low-income neighborhoods in Baltimore.
Ross notes that all of the subjects therefore arguably fell within the provisions of 45 C.F.R. §
46.406 and could be exposed to minor increases over minimal risks because they suffered the
condition being studied, but also noting the difficulties with too broadly promoting this interpreta-
tion. Lainie Friedman Ross, In Defense of the Hopkins Lead Abatement Studies, 30 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 50, 53 (2002) [hereinafter Ross, In Defense]. Ross comments:
I am not convinced that I) the children were healthy, as they were at serious risk for
plumbism; 2) the research was non-therapeutic, as it provided lead abatement to the
subjects' homes; and 3) if the research were classified as non-therapeutic, that the
research posed more than minimal risks to the children subjects. Rather, I have ar-
gued that the research was therapeutic, and that the control arm was morally permis-
sible.
Id. at 53.
63. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 855. Kennedy Krieger denied that the research was non-therapeutic
although the court disagreed. Id. at 839 n.32. In so doing, the court compared the research in the
case subjudice to a study from the 1940s and I 950s in which orphan children were verbally abused
and criticized to induce a stuttering disorder to prove that verbal abuse promoted stuttering: "The
[researchers conducting the stuttering study], however belatedly, . . . acknowledged the impropri-
ety of that experiment and apologized for its involvement. KKI continues to assert the propriety of
a study that is inherently inappropriate-no less so than the stuttering research on vulnerable or-
phans in the Midwest sixty years ago." Id.
64. Id. at 855.
65. Id. at 861-62.
66. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 813.
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and the IRB's role in the process" of approving research.67 It asserted
that the IRB misunderstood its own role in its willingness to aid the re-
searchers in circumventing federal regulations aimed to protect children
involved in non-therapeutic research.68 Moreover, the court explained
that "in spite of the IRB's improper attempt to manufacture a therapeutic
value, there was absolutely no such value of the research in respect to the
minor subjects used to measure the effectiveness of the study., 69
Although the court may have correctly recognized that the IRB mis-
conceived the notion of benefits under the federal regulatory scheme, the
concept of benefits is more complex than it appreciated.7 ° Generally,
when determining whether to approve research, federal regulations re-
quire IRBs to balance the risks and benefits to human subjects.7' When
the research involves children, these regulations are more stringent, re-
quiring researchers to invoke additional protections.72 When the research
provides no direct benefits to the subjects and is intended to contribute to
scientific knowledge in general, the researchers must closely scrutinize
the risk to child subjects.73 In these types of studies, IRBs may approve
this research on children only after determining that the study poses no
greater than minimal risks to the child.74
As one commentator explained, three possible benefits arise from re-
67. Id.
68. Id.; see also Kopelman, supra note 62, at 41 (questioning whether the non-therapeutic
distinction is germane under the federal regulations).
69. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 855. In addition, the court stated, "the IRB, whose primary function
was to insure safety and compliance with applicable regulations, encouraged the researchers to
misrepresent the purpose of the research in order to bring the study under the label of 'therapeutic'
and thus under a lower safety standard of regulation. The IRB's purpose was ethically wrong." Id.
at 817. But see Ross, In Defense, supra note 62, at 52-53 (suggesting that the court may have erred
in characterizing the study as non-therapeutic, and instead stating that it was a "therapeutic trial
that included an ethically appropriate (minimal risk) control arm").
70. See generally, e.g., Nancy M.P. King, Defining and Describing Benefit Appropriately in
Clinical Trials, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHiCS 332 (2000) (discussing the need to properly define benefits
in clinical research).
71. 45 C.F.R. § 46.11 l(a)(2) (2002) ("[T]he IRB shall determine that ... [rlisks to subjects
are reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects ...."). See generally King,
supra note 70 (advocating ways to adequately inform research subjects of risks and benefits);
Weijer, supra note 62 (discussing IRBs' roles in guarding against dangers to human research sub-
jects).
72. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 814. See generally 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401-409 (discussing the
supplementary requirements for research involving child subjects).
73. Weijer, supra note 62, at 349.
74. Id. "HHS will conduct or fund research in which the IRB finds that no greater than mini-
mal risk to children is presented, only if the IRB finds that adequate provisions are made for solic-
iting the assent of the children and the permission of their parents or guardians ...." 45 C.F.R. §
46.404. Research involving greater than minimal risk but offering the "prospect of direct benefit"
is permissible only if risks and benefits are balanced, "anticipated benefit[s] to the risk[s are] at
least as favorable to the subjects as [those] presented by available alternative approaches," and
guidelines are set forth for attempting to obtain adequate consent from children and parents. 45
C.F.R. § 46.405. Research presenting "an opportunity to understand, prevent, or alleviate a serious
problem affecting the health or welfare of children" but not meeting the criteria of the aforemen-
tioned categories must be approved by a panel of national experts. 45 C.F.R. § 46.407.
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search including:
[D]irect benefit to subjects, which is properly defined as benefit
arising from receiving the intervention being studied; collateral
benefit to subjects ... which is benefit arising from being a sub-
ject, even if one does not receive the experimental intervention
(for example, a free physical exam and testing, free medical care
and other extras, or the personal gratification of altruism); [and]
aspirational benefit, .or benefit to society and to future patients,
which arises from the results of the study.75
The free blood tests, house assessments, and educational information
provided to parents should be appropriately characterized as collateral or
indirect benefits since they were not derived from the intervention but
merely resulted from being included in the study. 76 Because the addi-
tional protections for children found in the regulations under Subpart D
instruct IRBs to consider only direct benefits, 7 the presence of collateral
benefits should not have changed the IRB's risk-benefit calculation.78
In Grimes, the benefit analysis is not simple because all of the chil-
dren did not benefit to the same extent.79 Some of the participants may
have gained only indirect benefits, whereas others enjoyed direct bene-
fits. o Children in groups one through three who were currently living in
75. King, supra note 70, at 333 (internal citations omitted). Federal regulations speak of
"direct benefits" but do not define them. See, e.g.. 45 C.F.R. § 46.405 ("HHS will conduct or fund
research in which the IRB finds that more than minimal risk to children is presented by an inter-
vention or procedure that holds out the prospect of direct benefit for the individual subject . . . only
if the [certain criteria are met]." (emphasis added)). They do, however, generally instruct IRBs to
evaluate only the risks and benefits of the research rather than evaluating the risks and benefits of
therapies provided to subjects not involved in the research. 45 C.F.R. § 46.11 l(a)(2). Because the
children in the Kennedy Krieger study received a heightened level of monitoring that might pro-
vide timely and worthwhile diagnostic information beyond routine healthcare, perhaps some IRBs
would characterize these benefits as direct although they were not the result of the research but
merely incident to being in the study. Unfortunately, the federal regulations provide little guidance
to aid in making such a conclusion.
76. See generally King, supra note 70, at 333 (describing the types of possible benefits to be
received for research participation).
77. See generally 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401-409 (discussing the supplementary requirements for
research involving child subjects).
78. A current debate exists concerning whether it is ethical to combine "risk-minimization
features and collateral benefit features into one package, and [to then] view the whole study as
providing direct benefit." King, supra note 70, at 339. Kopelman notes that Kennedy Krieger
might have characterized the screening and education benefits as direct under a "medical or public
health model" because the children were "at risk" and therefore appropriate subjects for a study
with greater than minimal risk. Kopelman, supra note 62, at 44. However, Kopelman questions this
characterization "if the court in Grimes is correct on the facts and the investigators had some role
in placing or keeping some children in homes with lead hazards." /d. at 44.
79. Direct and collateral benefits may become conflated by research designs. King, supra
note 70, at 339.
80. See generally id. Ross argues that all homes other than the control groups received some
lead abatement, and thus, subjects were benefited. Ross, In Defense, supra note 62, at 50-51. This
argument ignores the evidence suggesting that some homes were vacant, and therefore, the children
recruited to those homes may not have benefited from moving into those particular homes rather
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homes that later underwent repair and maintenance for the research re-
ceived some direct benefit because the lead levels in their homes were
presumably reduced. It remains unclear whether the children who moved
into the remediated homes upon entering the study directly benefited
because there is no way to determine the level of lead, if any, that was
present in alternative housing. Thus, these children could have either
benefited or have been put at increased risk. Children in control groups
four through five received no direct benefit since repair and maintenance
was not undertaken in their homes. All children received benefits by vir-
tue of blood test monitoring and the information their families received
regarding lead contamination in their homes. These benefits, however,
were not the result of the tested intervention, but rather, they merely con-
stitute indirect benefits resulting from inclusion in the study. Identifica-
tion of direct and indirect benefits baffles IRBs. As the National Bio-
ethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) explained, the analysis is quite
murky:
[I]RBs should be cautious in classifying procedures as offering
the prospect of direct benefit. In fact, if it is not clear that a pro-
cedure also offers the prospect of direct benefit, IRBs should
treat the procedure as one solely designed to answer the research
question(s). A major advantage of this approach is that it avoids
justifying the risks of procedures that are designed solely to an-
swer the research questions based on the likelihood that another
procedure in the protocol is likely to provide a benefit.81
In addition to their failure to provide a careful benefit analysis, the
IRB neglected to appreciate the risks presented by the study. For exam-
ple, the consent form did not fully acknowledge the risks. 2 Yet, the
study either knowingly allowed children to be exposed to a continuing
danger83 or actually increased exposure risks for others by placing some
subjects in homes where lead abatement was unfinished. 84 The fact that
than non-study homes.
81. NBAC, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note 11, at 13.
82. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 844.
83. Yet, Kennedy Krieger maintained that when lead blood levels rose, it recommended ap-
propriate medical intervention be sought. Lead-Based Paint Study, supra note 36.
84. In Ericka Grimes's case, her family resided in a home on Monroe Street in Baltimore
from 1990 to 1994. Grimes. 782 A.2d at 824. The Monroe property was arguably assigned to
Group IV (although this issue was not fully resolved) since the property had been previously reme-
diated. Id. at 824 n.21. Ericka was born in 1992, and she was recruited to the study in 1993. Id. at
824. "Hot spots," higher levels of lead dust, were discovered in March 1993 but not revealed to the
family until December 1993. Id. at 825. Although blood tests on Ericka in April 1993 were within
the normal range, two subsequent blood tests showed increasing blood lead levels. Id. One blood
test rose to the highly elevated range. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 825 n.23. The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants breached a duty to inform them of the hot spots and allowed Ericka to contract lead
poisoning. Id. at 826. Plaintiff Myron Higgins moved with her family into a Level 11 remediated
home in 1994 shortly after incomplete remediation. Id. at 826-27. The child's blood lead levels
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when the IRB first rejected the study it referred to healthy control chil-
dren as problematic,8 5 evidences that the IRB was likely concerned about
exposing the control children to the risks and discomforts of the periodic
blood drawing without first identifying the proportionate benefits. Per-
haps in order to justify those risks to the control population, the IRB
clarified that education on lead poisoning and information provided to
parents regarding their children's test results benefited the entire study
86group.
The IRB, however, apparently did not appreciate the risks the sub-
jects in the experimental group may have been exposed to or the uncer-
tainty of the benefits of abatement. Kennedy Krieger asserted in litiga-
tion and press releases that the IRB regarded the lead abatement activi-
ties in groups one, two, and three as beneficial to children.87 The IRB's
assumption proves problematic, however, because a number of the chil-
dren were placed into the homes that were only partially remediated 8 In
fact, the research question was how much remediation needs to be under-
taken to protect children from lead poisoning. Therefore, these children
may have been exposed to risks, and hence, placed in a worse position
rather than a healthier, beneficial one. The researchers should have iden-
tified the risk of lead exposure in all of the homes involved in the study
as a risk of participation. The participants who moved into these homes
now lived in residences that were previously contaminated and were cur-
rently being used to determine the level of repair and maintenance
needed in order to effectively minimize lead exposure. Moreover, even
for children already residing in lead contaminated homes, the study cre-
ated an increased risk. If the remediation undertaken in this study was
inadequate, then assuming the researchers effectively decreased the lead
levels in these homes, they still perpetuated a risk to children in homes
with some level of lead. Finally, as the plaintiffs alleged, by participating
in the study, the families were lulled into complacency. 89 For example,
fluctuated. The highest blood lead level placed the child in Class Ill, and her mother was advised
to "provide the test result to [her] child's primary health care provider right away." Id. at 828
(internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs contended that the researchers recorded high levels of
lead contaminated dust but failed to disclose this fact. Id. at 829. Instead, relying on a second
testing method (dust wipe samples), the researchers led Myron's mother to believe that the house
was clean. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 829. Plaintiffs alleged that only informing the mother of the "lower
results of the samples collected by dust wipe methodology was misleading" and "gave her a false
sense of security that there were no potential lead-based paint or dust hazards in her house." Id.
85. See id. at 814.
86. See id. at 813-14, 847-48.
87. See, e.g.. Lead-Based Paint Study, supra note 36 ("[K]KI believed this Study would
provide benefits to the Study participants since all participants would be living in housing that had
been improved or was new and would be monitored for blood lead levels on an ongoing basis.").
88. Kennedy Krieger denied that families were lured into homes that were not fully abated.
Id.
89. See. e.g.. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 826 ("[Appellant] and her mother continued to reside in the
home unaware of the hazards and unaware of the dangers to which [appellant] was being ex-
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the plaintiff participants complained that all of the attendant blood and
home inspections wrongfully caused them to believe that their children
as well as their homes were safe and regularly monitored for lead. 90
Regulations governing risk and benefit assessment in child studies
are complex and difficult to navigate.9' The concept, however, is rela-
tively simple: "As the risk of harm to the child increases, greater restric-
tions are imposed. 9 Where research involves no more than minimal
risks to the child,93 the research is permissible if one parent consents and
the child assents.94 If the research exposes a child to greater than minimal
risk but also holds potential for direct benefit, in addition to these afore-
mentioned requirements,9" the IRB must also determine that "[tihe risk is
justified by the anticipated benefit to the subjects" and that "[t]he rela-
tion of the anticipated benefit to the risk is at least as favorable to the
subjects as that presented by available alternative approaches. 96 In con-
trast, research that offers the potential for direct benefit to the child and
involves greater than minimal risk is permissible with assent and permis-
sion of both parents, 97 and when the following requirements are met:
The risk represents a minor increase over minimal risk; [t]he in-
tervention or procedure presents experiences to subjects that are
reasonably commensurate with those inherent in their actual or
expected medical, dental, psychological, social, or educational
situations; [t]he intervention or procedure is likely to yield gen-
eralizable knowledge about the subjects' disorder or condition
which is of vital importance for the understanding or ameliora-
tion of the subjects' disorder or condition; and [a]dequate provi-
sions are made for soliciting assent of the children and permis-
posed.").
90. lI. at 825-26, 828. Families were given blood test results promptly, but results of home
testing for lead contamination were delayed. Id. at 826. Moreover, the results of Cyclone testing
were never provided although Kennedy Krieger claimed this withholding was justifiable because
the Cyclone vacuum was merely experimental. Id. at 845.
91. See generally Jennifer Rosato, The Ethics of Clinical Trials: A Child's View, 28 J.L. MED.
& ETHicS 362, 366 (2000) ("The complex provisions of HHS Subpart D [the federal regulations
dealing with additional protections for child subjects] are guided by a matrix of factors ... .
92. Id.
93. Minimal risk is the only risk defined by federal regulation, and it means "that the prob-
ability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of
themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine
physical or psychological examinations or tests." 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i).
94. Rosato, supra note 91, at 366; see also 45 C.F.R. § 46.408(a) (describing the requirement
of assent by children). When dealing with children too young to provide mature assent, IRBs must
make an additional judgment "that the intervention or procedure involved in the research holds out
a prospect of direct benefit that is important to the health or well-being of the children and is avail-
able only in the context of the research." Id.
95. 45 C.F.R. § 46.408 (b).
96. 45 C.F.R. § 46.405 (a)-(b).
97. 45 C.F.R. § 46.408 (b).
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sion of their parents or guardians. 98
The Kennedy Krieger research presented several issues concerning
risk. The quarterly blood draws on healthy children did not likely consti-
tute a greater than minimal risk. Although uncomfortable to a healthy
child and somewhat more excessive than typical to a normal child's
health experiences, these blood withdrawals were not uncharacteristically
outside the scope of their experiences.99 In addition, the questionnaires
and family home studies should also likely be characterized as no greater
than minimal risk because aside from time and perhaps some invasion of
privacy, the children were not realistically harmed as a result. The core
of the research, however, presented risks that were apparently underesti-
mated by either the researchers or the IRB. First, while researchers noted
that many homes in Baltimore were contaminated with lead and not
abated, some of these units were either not in the rental market or not
rented to vulnerable children. The study protocol, however, brought sev-
eral of these homes into the rental market or facilitated their rental to the
participant parents.' 00 Second, all homes included in the study were re-
quired to either have undergone abatement to some prescribed degree, or
if in a control group, to have been previously abated or of modem (and
therefore, lead-free) origin.' 0' The heart of the study, however, centered
on the recognition that the level of abatement necessary to reduce the
risk of lead poisoning in previously contaminated homes was un-
known. 10 2 Thus, by its design, the study proposed to attract families with
children or induce families with children to remain in homes that may or
may not have been adequately lead-abated.'
0 3
The consent form explained to parents that the study proposed to de-
98. 45 C.F.R. § 46.406 (a)-(d). The Kennedy Krieger children were not necessarily lead toxic
at the outset of the study, and thus, for purposes of this regulation, they did not have a disorder or
condition that might be improved by their participation in the study.
99. See IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 59, at ch. 6 pt. C ("Procedures that usually present no
more than minimal risk to a healthy child include: urinalyses, obtaining small blood samples,
EEGs, allergy scratch tests, minor changes in diet or daily routine, and/or the use of standard psy-
chological or educational tests.").
100. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 826. For example, the home into which Myron Higgins moved was
vacant until the property owner accepted it into Group II when it was, thereafter, partially abated.
Id. The landlord then rented the property to the Higgins family. Id. at 827.
101. Id. at 822-23.
102. /d at 819.
103. It is unclear from the available information whether Kennedy Krieger viewed the three
levels of abatement as in "equipoise." "Equipoise" exists where there is genuine uncertainty as to
what treatment is preferable. Benjamin Freedman, Equipoise and the Ethics of Clinical Research,
317 N. ENG. J. MED. 141, 141 (1987) (internal citations omitted). Whether the researchers were
genuinely uncertain as to the effect of the three levels is unclear. Their information sheet suggests
that all three levels of abatement reduced lead in homes by eighty percent. However, the purpose of
the study was to test the effectiveness of the various levels of remediation on exposure. Lead-
Based Paint Study, supra note 36. Yet, a logical inference is that the group receiving the most
remediation enjoyed more lead abatement in their homes.
20021
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termine how well "two levels of repair work" succeeded in reducing ex-
posure to lead paint. 10 4 Moreover, it warned parents that "lead poisoning
in children is a problem in Baltimore City,"1 °5 and that they were se-
lected to participate in the study so to have repair work done on their
homes in order to decrease exposure to lead paint and dust. 10 6 The form
further informed parents that "[t]he repairs [were] not intended, or ex-
pected, to completely remove exposure to lead."'0 7 Despite these general
acknowledgements, the consent form failed to explain that the remaining
lead contamination in the home could result in lead exposure and toxic-
ity.'08 Most remarkably, it failed to identify any risks associated with the
study and, in fact, did not even contain a risk section. 10 9
B. Landmark Decision
1. The Legal Bases for the Researcher's Duties.-In Grimes, the
court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Kennedy Krieger." ° Holding that three distinct legal theories could cre-
ate a special relationship between researcher and human subjects for the
purpose of negligence liability,'1 ' the court explained that these relation-
ships must be determined on a "case-by-case basis.""' 2 The court ex-
plained that a special relationship between the researchers and the human
subjects in this instance may arise from federal regulations protecting
human subjects, the Nuremberg Code, contractual obligations based on
the design of the research and parental consent, and by the special rela-
tionship created between the researcher and the subject, particularly in
light of a child's vulnerability.'13
104. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 824.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. This statement is particularly ambiguous, however, and raises questions: Did the
remaining exposure that the form refers to mean lead in the home or lead exposure outside the
home? Did the use of the words "intended, or expected" mean that the researchers intended to
leave some lead contamination behind after remediation?
108. Id. at 844.
109. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 844. Federal regulations require consent documents to inform the
subjects of potential risks or discomforts. 45 C.F.R. § 46.1 16(a)(2).
110. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 858.
111. Id. Remarkably, Kennedy Krieger later retreated from its assertion that it owed no legal
duty to plaintiffs:
While in the lower court, KKI's insurance lawyers made a legalistic argument that
KKI had "no legal duty" to report the dust levels to families. KKI regrets this tech-
nical argument and wants to reassure the public that in this Study, and in all past and
future studies, KKI has been and is committed to families and all persons in its re-
search trials.
Lead-Based Paint Study, supra note 36.
112. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 858 ("We hold that there was ample evidence in the cases at bar to
support a fact finder's determination of the existence of duties arising out of contract, or out of a
special relationship, or out of regulations and codes, or out of all of them, in each of the cases.").
113. Id.
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The court pointed to the contractual characteristics in the relationship
between researchers and their subjects." 14 Researchers promised to pro-
vide each family with compensation, information on the lead levels in
their child's blood, and information regarding lead poisoning." 5 In re-
turn, parents consented on behalf of themselves and their children to
make their children available for blood tests, answer questionnaires peri-
odically, and to grant researchers access to their homes in order to test
for lead. 1 6 The court held that based on the record, "mutual assent, offer,
acceptance, and consideration existed, all of which created contractual
relationships imposing duties by reason of the consent agreement. '' 1'7
Accordingly, this relationship constituted a "bilateral contract between
the parties," which required "full, detailed, prompt, and continuing warn-
ings as to all the potential risks and hazards inherent in the research or
that arise during the research."'" 18 Thus, study participation created a con-
tractual relationship between researchers and their subjects." 9
The court further determined that the lower court erred in holding
that a special relationship cannot arise from the duties a researcher owes
to a research subject.120 Instead, the appellate court reasoned that only in
rare instances, such as research involving studies of "compilation of al-
ready extant statistics," a researcher-subject relationship might not im-
pose researcher duties to subjects. 12' As a general rule, however, "the
creation of study conditions or protocols or participation in the recruit-
ment of otherwise healthy subjects to interact with already existing, or
potentially existing, hazardous conditions, or both, for the purpose of
creating statistics from which scientific hypotheses can be supported,"
typically establishes "special relationships as a matter of law."'' 22
Thus, the court held that exposing healthy subjects, particularly chil-
dren whose parents must consent for them, to the risks associated with
this study, warranted the imposition of a special relationship with its
concomitant duties in tort. 123 In its defense, Kennedy Krieger asserted
that it was nothing more than an "institutional volunteer" and that it
owed no duty to protect the subjects. 124 Taking into account the grant
114. Id. at 819.
115. Id. at 843.
116. Id. Research subjects retain an absolute and unfettered right to withdraw from research at
any time. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(8) (stating that the informed consent must provide a statement
informing subject that he/she "may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of
benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled").
I 17. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 843.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 844.
120. Id. at 858.
121. Id. at 845-46.
122. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 846.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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money it received to conduct the research, the court questioned Kennedy
Krieger's volunteer status, 25 and it then refused to afford immunity
status to researchers involved in human subject experimentation absent a
legislative directive to do so.
26
The court also evaluated the special duties arising from the duties
imposed by federal regulations and the Nuremberg Code. Beginning by
noting that "[a] duty may be prescribed by a statute, or a special relation-
ship creating duties may arise from the requirement for compliance with
statutory provisions,"'127 the court examined the panoply of federal regu-
lations designed to ensure that federally funded or sponsored research is
"conducted in accordance with sound ethical principles." 28 The court
focused on the special federal provisions designed to give added protec-
tion to children,129 as well as regulations ensuring fully informed con-
sent.1 30 According to the court, a special relationship establishing duties
may arise from federally imposed regulations. 13 ' Because these duties
continue throughout the course of the research, researchers are required
to inform participants when risks are presented or altered. 3 2 Thus, the
court allowed a cause of action by human subjects based upon a re-
searcher's violations of federal regulations intended for human subject
protection.
Remarkably, the court also looked to the Nuremberg Code as one
source describing a researcher's duty to her human subjects. 33 This judi-
125. Id. at 846 n.36.
126. Id. at 846.
127. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 846.
128. Id. at 848 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 46.407(b)(2)(ii)).
129. Id. at 846, 848; see also Additional Protections for Children Involved as Subjects in
Research, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401-409.
130. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 846-49.
131. Id. at 849.
132. Id.
133. Id. The Nuremberg Code states:
I. The voluntary consent of the hurnan subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent;
should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the in-
tervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ul-
terior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and
comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to
make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that
before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there
should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment;
the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards
reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person which may pos-
sibly come from his participation in the experiment.
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon
each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It is a personal
duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to another with impunity.
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society,
unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not random and unnecessary
in nature.
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal experi-
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cial adoption of the Nuremberg Code as a source of ethics in research
provides courts with a comprehensive structure, independent of federal
statutory law, by which to judge research ethics. Although the court rec-
ognized that the Code was intended for international application, 13 4 it
nevertheless held that "[t]he breach of obligations imposed ...by the
Nuremberg Code, might well support actions sounding in negligence in
such cases as those at issue here."'135 By determining that in tort law, the
researcher-subject relationship is distinctive, and by adopting the Nur-
emberg Code as a methodology for judicial review of human research,
the court carved out a powerful position for the judiciary, separate from
the federal regulatory system, to act in protecting human research sub-
jects. The moral force of the Nuremberg Code's two fundamental con-
cepts of voluntary consent and risk-benefit analysis is unassailable. 136
mentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other problem un-
der study that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experiment.
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and
mental suffering and injury.
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to believe
that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those experiments
where the experimental physicians also serve as subjects.
6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the hu-
manitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment.
7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to protect the
experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury, disability, or death.
8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified persons. The
highest degree of skill and care should be required through all stages of the experi-
ment of those who conduct or engage in the experiment.
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to
bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or mental state where
continuation of the experiment seemed to him to be impossible.
10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be prepared to
terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probably [sic] cause to believe, in
the exercise of the good faith, superior skill and careful judgment required of him
that a continuation of the experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or death
to the experimental subject.
IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 59, at app. 6. A historical account of the Nazi doctor trials, the devel-
opment of the Nuremberg Code, and its ethical underpinnings is provided in THE NAZI DOCTORS
AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION (George Annas &
Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992).
134. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 849. See generally Dawn Joyce Miller, Comment, Research Ac-
countability: The Need for Uniform Regulation of International Pharmaceutical Drug Testing, 13
PACE INT'L L. REV. 197, 202-05 (2001) (noting the influence of the Code in general but recogniz-
ing its limited role as binding authority in international law).
135. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 849. The court explained that the Code, while never judicially
adopted, provided the "most complete and authoritative statement of the law of informed consent
to human experimentation," and it "may be applied, in both civil and criminal cases, by state,
federal, and municipal courts in the United States." Id. at 835 (quoting George J. Annas, Mengele 's
Birthmark: The Nuremberg Code in United States Courts, 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 17,
21 (Spring 1991)).
136. As others have noted, the Nuremberg Code has been cited from time to time, but "no U.S.
court has ever awarded damages to an injured experimental subject, or punished an experimenter,
on a basis of a violation of the Code." Jeffrey H. Barker, Human Experimentation and the Double
Facelessness of a Merciless Epoch, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 603, 608 (1999) (quoting
George J. Annas, The Nuremberg Code in U.S. Courts: Ethics Versus Expediency, in THE NAZI
DOCTORS, supra note 133, at 201).
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These precepts are the foundation of the current federal schema and to
the extent the court drew from them general principles of ethics and cus-
tomary practices it is not surprising. However, particular provisions
within the Code could heighten researchers' responsibilities and limit
research activities beyond current law, putting it at odds with federal
regulations. 137 For example, the Code's stringent requirement that all
subjects have legal capacity and give voluntary consent and its lack of
any specific guidance concerning children and the incapacitated could
curtail research on these populations generally.
138
2. KKI Likely Breached Its Duties.-The court identified three in-
stances in which Kennedy Krieger may have breached its duty to the par-
ticipants involved in the study. First, the court noted that the parents
were not likely provided with adequate information about the nature of
the study and the risks to the children. 39 According to the court, the con-
sent form was flawed because it failed to "directly inform the parents...
it was contemplated that some of the children might ingest lead dust par-
ticles," 140 and the children's blood was tested in order "to evaluate how
effective the various abatement measures" proved. 14' The court further
noted that "a reasonable parent would expect to be clearly informed" that
lead ingestion was anticipated. 42 As the court explained, Kennedy
Krieger should have informed the parents that the researchers intended
for the children to remain in the "house until the conclusion of the
study,"'143 which may conceivably lead to "some accumulation of lead in
the [children's] blood."'144 Finally, the court explained that although this
information may have effectively dissuaded parents from enrolling in the
study, that fact alone did not constitute a ground to exclude it from the
consent form. 1
45
Second, in reversing summary judgment, the court held that regard-
less of the completeness of the disclosure and the presence of parental
consent, the research design may have been fundamentally flawed, and
137. See Kendall Ann Desaulniers, Legislation to Protect the Decisionally Incapacitated Indi-
vidual's Participation in Medical Research: Safety Net or Trap Door?, 13 REGENT U.L. REV. 179,
183 (2000) (commenting that the Declaration of Helsinki was promulgated, in part, to address
restrictive provisions of the Nuremberg Code).
138. See Ann E. Ryan, Comment, Protecting the Rights of Pediatric Research Subjects in the
International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of Phar-
maceuticals for Human Use, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 848, 866-68 (2000) (noting critics who con-
sider "the Code as too restrictive to allow for human experimentation using any subjects other than
competent adults").
139. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 844.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 844.
145. Id.
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as a result, it might have exposed children to an impermissible risk. 46 In
a sweeping statement, the court opined, "otherwise healthy children
should not be the subjects of non-therapeutic experimentation or research
that has the potential to be harmful to the child.' 47 Accordingly, neither
the subject's consent nor IRB approval eliminates the researcher's
duty. 48 Rather, the researcher must fulfill the duty of obtaining consent,
but the researcher's "duty to a vulnerable research subject is independent
of [that] consent." 149 As the court explained, research, by its very nature
and objective, may subordinate the subject's health "to the dictates of a
research protocol designed to advance knowledge for the sake of future
patients."' 5° Although this objective is clearly important, research re-
quires fundamental safeguards that were likely absent in the Kennedy
Krieger study.' 5 ' In light of the attendant risks to vulnerable subjects, the
court concluded, at least for summary judgment purposes, "no degree of
parental consent, and no degree of furnished information to the parents
could make the experiment at issue here, ethically or legally permissible.
It was wrong in the first instance."'
5 2
Third, the court severely circumscribed the parameters of parental
consent in non-therapeutic research. The court explained that henceforth,
in Maryland, "a parent . . . cannot consent to the participation of a child
or other person under legal disability in non-therapeutic research or stud-
ies in which there is any risk of injury or damage to the [child's]
health."' 53 Therefore, even if full disclosure occurred, the nature of the
risks were such that parents should not have been permitted to consent to
these risks. 54 This parental limitation is based on the broader social obli-
gation to protect children generally. As the court explained, "it is unac-
ceptable to expose otherwise healthy children, incapable of personal as-
sent (consent), to a non-therapeutic research environment that is known
at the inception of the research, might cause the children to ingest lead
dust."'5 5 This study was particularly troubling since one "measurement of
the [experiment's] success ...[was] determined by the extent to which
the blood of the children absorbs, and is contaminated by, a substance
that the researcher knows can ...cause serious and long term adverse
146. Id. at 850-51.
147. Id. at 850.
148. Id.
149. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 850.
150. Id. at 851 (quoting Jay Katz, Human Experimentation and Human Rights, 38 ST. LouiS U.
L.J. 7, 8 (1993)).
151. Id. at 852.
152. Id. at 857-58.
153. Id. at 858. This holding alarmed amici organizations. They asserted in a motion for recon-
sideration that the court's ruling would adversely curtail pediatric research and undermine their
customary practices. Kopelman, supra note 62, at 41.
154. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 852-58.
155. Id. at 853.
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health effects."' 5 6 The court later clarified that "any risk" means "any
articulable risk beyond the minimal kind of risk that is inherent in any
endeavor."' 
57
By imposing a duty on researchers to obtain judicial review prior to
enrolling children in non-therapeutic research that poses risks, the
Grimes decision has far reaching implications. In the Kennedy Krieger
research, neither the researchers nor the parents sought impartial judicial
review prior to commencement of the study. 58 According to the court, in
the absence of a mandate requiring judicial review, researchers and sci-
entific review boards would constitute "the sole judges of whether it is
appropriate to use children in nontherapeutic research."' 59 As the court
recognized, it would be a serious mistake to allow science alone to de-
termine "the appropriateness of such research methods on human sub-
jects, especially in respect to children."' 6 By requiring judicial review,
children will be better protected from research abuses. The courts' role in
this process would be to establish the child's interest as paramount to all
others. According to the court, courts will refuse to "defer to science."
'161
Therefore, the court established itself as the ultimate guardian of the
child's best interests. As the court explained, regardless of the interests
of parents and "of the general public in fostering research that might,
according to a researcher's hypothesis, be for the good of all children,
this Court's concern for the particular child and particular case,
over-arches all other interests." 162 The court then stated that "[i]t is sim-
ply ... not in the best interest of any healthy child to be intentionally put
in a non-therapeutic situation where his or her health may be impaired, in
order to test methods that may ultimately benefit all children."'163 Thus,
156. Id.
157. Id. at 862.
158. Id. at 855.
159. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 855.
160. Id. The court relied on Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. 1972), which involved
a kidney donation and transplant between seven-year-old identical twins, and Strunk v. Strunk, 445
S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969), involving sibling organ donation by a mentally incompetent donor.
What is of primary importance to be gleaned in the Hart and Strunk cases is not that
the parents or guardians consented to the procedures, but that they first sought per-
mission of the courts, and received that permission, before consenting to a non-
therapeutic procedure in respect to some of their minor children, but that was thera-
peutic to other of their children.
Grimes, 782 A.2d at 854-55.
161. Id. at 855.
162. Id. at 853.
163. Id. The court's holding is in accord with the notion that a parent should not be able to
foreclose a child's right to an open future without judicial review. Id. at 812-17, 824-25. Thus,
parents and physicians should not be able to make unilateral decisions on sterilization and other
life-altering elective surgery for children without judicial review. See Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton
Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma: Should Physicians Perform Sex Assignment
Surgery on Infants with Ambiguous Genitalia?, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. I, 37-45, 57-58 (2000)
(questioning parental and physician decision-making authority to consent to or perform sex as-
signment surgery on infants with ambiguous genitalia without judicial review).
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the court concluded that the current ethical obligations placed on re-
searchers to ensure protection of human subjects, the IRB's independent
review of the project, and parental consent are not sufficient safeguards
to protect children subjects.' 64 By acknowledging the flaws in the current
system, this holding established a prospective judicial role in protecting
child subjects well beyond post-injury compensation. In light of an in-
creasing recognition that the federal system is inadequate to protect hu-
man subjects, the Grimes decision suggests an expanded judicial role in
the protection of human subjects.
III. THE IRB AS THE FRONT LINE IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
SUBJECTS
The Grimes court was not alone in concluding that the current system
is seriously deficient.165 For the past twenty-five years, institutions con-
ducting human subject research with Health and Human Services spon-
sorship or funding have been required to abide by a complex body of
federal regulations designed to protect human subjects.1 66 Largely in re-
sponse to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 167 the National Research Act en-
acted in 1974 established regulations designed to protect human research
subjects. 168 Under these new regulations, "the IRBs-rather than princi-
pal investigators-became responsible for determining whether potential
research subjects are 'at risk,' and if so, whether the risks outweigh pos-
164. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 814-18. Arising out of similar concerns for children as a vulnerable
class, others have also considered the limits of parental authority to consent on behalf of children.
Compare Lainie Friedman Ross, Children as Research Subjects: A Proposal to Revise the Current
Federal Regulations Using a Moral Framework, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 159, 166-69 (1997)
(arguing that research on children that poses more than a minor increase over minimal risk without
"proportionate benefit" to the child "is immoral," but also stating that parents should be able to
consent to non-therapeutic minimal risk research).
165. In 1998, the Office of Inspector General issued an extensive report warning that IRBs are
not equipped to adequately fulfill the review and approval requirements expected of them. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General, OEI-01-97-00193, Institutional
Review Boards: A Time for Reform iii (June 1998) http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/a276.pdf [herein-
after Inspector General, Time for Reform]. Numerous researchers have also explained that the
current IRB system does not adequately protect human subjects and should be overhauled. See.
e.g., James F. Childress, The National Bioethics Advisory Commission: Bridging the Gap in Hu-
man Subjects Research Protections, I J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 105, 113-14 (1998); Jay Katz,
Human Experimentation and Human Rights, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 7, 9 (1993); Adil E. Shamoo,
Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) and Conflict of Interest, 7 ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESEARCH 201,
205-07 (1999) [hereinafter Shamoo, Conflict of Interest]; Alison Wichman, Protecting Vulnerable
Research Subjects: Practical Realities of Institutional Review Board Review and Approval, I J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 88, 97-102 (1998).
166. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-409 (2002); 21 C.F.R. §§56.101-124(2002).
167. Anderlik & Elster, supra note 1, at 222. In the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, "approximately
400 African-American men with syphilis were left untreated to try to gain a scientific understand-
ing of the progression of the disease. Although the study had been ongoing since the 1930s, it was
not until a 1972 newspaper story about the research that the public became aware of the deficien-
cies of the study." Id.
168. Id.
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sible benefits to them and the importance of the knowledge to be gained
from the research."' 169 In addition, the Act also "led to the establishment
of the OPRR 7° and the National Commission for the Protection of Hu-
man Subjects,"' 7  which was responsible for examining the problems in
research involving human subjects and recommending guidelines.'72 Fur-
thermore, the FDA issued regulations, and "[i]n 1981, the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) revised the regulations ... found at
45 C.F.R. § 46 and, in 1983, added Subpart D to provide additional pro-
tections for children participating in research," 73 which were subse-
quently adopted by "fifteen other federal agencies and became known as
the Common Rule.' 74 In addition to the Common Rule, typically, under
assurances negotiated with the federal government, institutions also
"pledg[e] conformity with the regulations [for] all research, irrespective
of the source of funding." 7 5 In order to adequately protect human sub-
jects, the system anticipates that there will be a check on the researcher
and that researchers will design experiments that protect participants.
176
169. Id. (quoting James Bell et al., Final Report: Evaluation of NIH Implementation of Section
491 of the Public Health Service Act, Mandating a Program of Protection for Research Subjects 12
(1998), available at http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/hsp_report/hsp_finalrpt.pdf.
170. The Office for Protection from Research Risks (OPRR) was established in 1972 to ensure
the protection of human subjects participating in U.S. Department of Health and Human Services-
sponsored research. In 2000, the office was succeeded by the Office of Human Research Protec-
tions (OHRP) with the intent to "elevate its stature and effectiveness." HHS Fact Sheet, Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (June 6, 2000), available at
http:www.hhs.gov/news/press/2000pres/20000606a.html.
171. Anderlik & Elster, supra note 1, at 222-23.
172. Id. at 223.
173. Id.
174. Id. The Common Rule is the federal policy extending the protections of human subjects
requirements to the United States Department of Agriculture, Department of Energy, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, Department of Commerce, Consumer Product Safety
Commission, International Development Cooperation Agency, Agency for International Develop-
ment, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of Justice, Department of
Defense, Department of Education, Department of Veterans Affairs, Environmental Protection
Agency, National Science Foundation, Department of Health and Human Services, and Department
of Transportation. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,003
(1991). The Common Rule unified regulatory language "did not create a shared mechanism for
interpreting and implementing the regulations," and thus, there is little uniformity. NBAC,
ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note II, at 9. Some federal agencies have supplanted the
Common Rule with additional provisions, compounding IRB confusions over regulations. Id. at II.
And because each agency is a signatory, the Rule is difficult to amend, resulting in agency devia-
tions by regulatory guidance. Id.
175. Jesse A. Goldner, An Overview of Legal Controls on Human Experimentation and the
Regulatory Implications of Taking Professor Katz Seriously, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 63, 99 (1993).
176. Id. at 98 (citing The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Bio-
medical and Behavior Research, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Pub. No. (OS) 78-
0008, Institutional Review Boards: Report and Recommendations (1978) (stating that the IRB
system serves as an independent check on the researcher's self interest). As one commentator
explained:
IRBs are important because research investigators have an inherent conflict of inter-
est. As health care professionals, they are dedicated to promoting the welfare of in-
dividual patients; as researchers, they seek generalizable knowledge applicable to
persons other than their individual patients. Because the second goal may come in
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The lynchpin of the federal system'77 is the requirement that under a
written assurance the institution supplies to the government, it promises
to establish and maintain an Institutional Review Board to independently
review and approve research.178 The regulatory provisions attempt to
ensure adequate review by mandating that IRB members have sufficient
experience, competence, and independence to perform their tasks.
179
Each IRB must consist of at least five members "with varying back-
grounds.' 80 At least one member must be unaffiliated with the institu-
tion. 18' In addition, one member must principally represent scientific
concerns, whereas one must represent nonscientific concerns.' 82 Mem-
bers who have conflicts of interest are prohibited from participating in
decision-making.' 83
The underpinnings of the technical substantive and procedural rules
that guide the conduct and deliberations of IRBs were taken from the
Nuremberg Code, 184 the World Medical Association Declaration of Hel-
sinki, "'85 and particularly the Belmont Report, 186 three profoundly simple
conflict with the first, our society has decided that an objective review of human
subjects research by a group of diverse individuals is most likely to protect human
subjects and promote ethically sound research.
Wichman, supra note 165, at 92.
177. The federal government funds a substantial amount of medical research. Darren E. Zinner,
Medical R & D at the Turn of the Millennium, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Sept. I, 2001, available at 2001
WL 10696976. "Federal obligations for life science and medical research increased ... from $1.01
billion in 1967 ... to $16.17 billion in 1999." Id.
178. 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(b).
179. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a). Section 46.103 requires that the IRB expertise be adequate in light
of the scope of the research conducted at the institution. 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(d). This is interpreted
to include knowledge of the local research community, so that where research is conducted outside
the geographical confines of the institution, the IRB must carefully document how it has ensured
that it was adequately informed of that local community, through the expertise of its membership,
through expert consultation, through visitation or by other methods. See Department of Health and
Human Services, Office of Human Research Participants, IRB Knowledge of Local Research Con-
text, available at http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/humansubjects/guidance/Iocal.htm. The federal
government's demand for documentation of this is clear. See. e.g., Compliance Letter to Chi Van
Dang, The Johns Hopkins University, Human Research Subject Protections Under Multiple Project
Assurance M- 1011, (Oct. 3, 2001), available at http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/detrm letrs/oct01a.pdf
("At its July 31, 2001 meeting, the IRB approved a clinical trial that was to be conducted in Brazil.
It is unclear which members of the IRB had expertise regarding the local context where this re-
search was to be conducted. Please respond.").
180. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a).
181. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(d).
182. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(c).
183. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(e).
184. See Leonard H. Glantz, The Influence of the Nurenmberg Code on U.S. Statutes and Regu-
lations, in THE NAZI DOCTORS, supra note 133, at 183-200. The Nuremberg Code, espousing
voluntary consent and respect for individuals as the cornerstone of experimentation, was developed
by the International Military Tribunal that tried Nazi physicians for the medical experimentation
conducted on concentration camp inmates without consent. See Michael A. Grodin, Historical
Origins of the Nuremberg Code, in THE NAZI DOCTORS, supra note 133, at 121-41.
185. The Declaration of Helsinki outlines recommendations for biomedical research involving
human subjects. Sharona Hoffman, The Use of Placebos in Clinical Trials: Responsible Research
or Unethical Practice, 33 CONN. L. REV. 449, 474-75 (2001). Adopted by the Eighteenth World
Medical Association General Assembly at Helsinki, Finland in 1964, it was revised again in 1975,
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and eloquent ethical codes concerning human experimentation.18 7 In or-
der to promote adherence to ethics, IRBs are instructed to assess risks,
ensuring that they are reasonable in light of the benefits 8 8 and have been
minimized by sound research design, 8 9 that selection of subjects is equi-
table, care has been taken to protect vulnerable populations,' 90 and le-
gally effective informed consent has been obtained' 9' prior to approving
the research on human subjects. In particular, IRBs are required to pro-
vide heightened protection to certain groups, "when some or all of the
subjects are likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence, such
as children, prisoners, pregnant women, mentally disabled persons, or
economically or educationally disadvantaged persons."' 92 The regula-
tions address in detail the special protections afforded to research involv-
ing children, 93 prisoners, '94 as well as pregnant women and in vitro fer-
tilization.,95
IV. THE IRBs' ROLE IN RECENT HUMAN SUBJECT RESEARCH GONE
AWRY
A number of other well-publicized incidents occurring in the past
two or three years have demonstrated the flaws in the current system.
These studies have shaken public confidence in human subject research
and, in each, criticism was lodged against local IRBs as well as research-
1983, 1989, 1996, and 2000. Id. at 474. It demands that experimental procedures must be inde-
pendently reviewed, conform to generally accepted scientific principals, hazards be identified,
predicted and weighed against the benefits, and that the subject's interests "must always prevail
over the interests of science and society." World Med. Ass'n, Declaration of Helsinki, 1964, as
amended by WMA 48th General Assembly, Somerset West, South Africa, Oct. 1996, available at
www.wma.net/e/policy/17c.pdf, at 1-5.
186. The Belmont report was commissioned in 1974 and first published under the National
Research Act of 1979. Department of Health, Education & Welfare, Belmont Report: Ethical Prin-
ciples & Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research. Report of the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 44 Fed.
Reg. 23,192 (Apr. 18, 1979). It identified respect for persons, beneficence, and justice as three
basic ethical principles relevant to research involving human subjects. Id. at 23,193-94. Applica-
tion of these principles is achieved through informed consent, the careful assessment of risks and
benefits, and the proper selection of subjects. Id. at 23,195-96; see also Hoffman, supra note 185,
at 472-74 (discussing the Belmont Report).
187. See Richard Delgado & Helen Leskovac, Informed Consent in Human Experimentations.
Bridging the Gap Between Ethical Thought and Current Practice, 34 UCLA L. REV. 67, 71 n.14
(1986); see also National Institutes of Health, Historical, Ethical. and Legal Foundations for the
NIH's Policies and Procedures, available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines.php3#xappl (last
modified Mar. 2, 1995).
188. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (a)(2).
189. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (a)(I).
190. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (a)(3).
191. 45C.F.R.§46.111 (a)(4).
192. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (b).
193. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401-409.
194. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.301-306.
195. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201-211.
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ers. 96 These events include the death of Jesse Gelsinger, an eighteen-
year-old volunteer with an inherited liver disorder, who died during a
gene therapy experiment at the University of Pennsylvania; 197 allegations
that as many as twenty participants in a study conducted at the Fred Hut-
chinson Cancer Center may have died unnecessarily during the course of
a twelve-year-long cancer treatment study because scientists ignored
clear evidence that the treatment did not work and actually harmed sub-
jects; 19' and the death of twenty-four-year-old Ellen Roche, a healthy
research volunteer who died within days of inhaling an unapproved drug
used to induce asthma-like symptoms. 199 Though these incidents have
recently drawn national attention to the issue of human subject research,
they are by no means isolated events.2°° Indeed, some suggest that these
incidents occur more frequently than believed and that they result from
fundamental failures in the system designed to protect human subjects.
Lawsuits in these cases may invite more courts to examine the national
system of human subject protections and prompt changes.
In 2001, the Seattle Times published a five-part investigative report
describing "Protocol 126," a blood cancer experiment conducted over a
twelve-year period in the 1980s and 1990s at the premier Fred Hutchin-
son Cancer Research Center.201 The Seattle Times reported that perhaps
as many as twenty subjects likely died prematurely as a result of the
failed experiment that continued despite evidence that the protocol did
not work and was leading to premature deaths.0 2 According to the Seat-
196. See Anderlik & Elster, supra note 1, at 220-25 (discussing these recent incidents and
potential IRB member liability).
197. See infra notes 214-235 and accompanying text.
198. See infra notes 201-213 and accompanying text.
199. See infra notes 236-255 and accompanying text.
200. Other adverse events drawing public attention include: the death of Gage Stewart, an
infant suffering gastroesophageal reflux disorder, at a pharmaceutical clinical trial of two drugs at
Children's Hospital in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; the death of three-year-old Tyler Shelton at the
University of Arkansas Children's Hospital during a clinical trial on treatment of kidney cancer
after improper cancer staging; and the death of healthy Nicole Wan, age nineteen, at the University
of Rochester, following administration of a toxic dose of lidocaine during an experiment on the
effects of smoking and air pollution. See Sharon Begley & Donna Foote, Trials and Errors. NEWS
& OBSERVER, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, Sept. 9, 2001, at A25, available at A252001 WL
3481841. Historical accounts of human subject research abuses include: LEVINE, ETHICS AND
REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH, 69-72 (2d ed. 1988); THE NAZI DOCTORS, supra note 133;
see also Katz, supra note 165 (providing historical details of numerous notorious cases throughout
history).
201. Duff Wilson & David Heath, Uninformed Consent, What Patients at "'The Hutch"
Weren't Told About the Experiments in Which They Died, SEATTLE TIMES, March 11-15, 2001,
available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/uniformedconsent/ [hereinafter SEATTLE TIMES].
This site is a repository for the initial five articles, supporting documents, responses from Fred
Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, and other links; see also Anderlik & Elster, supra note 1,
221-22 (2001) (describing events leading to the filing of the lawsuit).
202. SEATTLE TIMES, Blood Cancer Experiment, supra note 201. The protocol was designed to
determine whether using monoclonal antibodies to kill T-cells during bone marrow transplants
would reduce graft-versus-host disease, an immune reaction to transplants that had a five to ten
percent mortality rate. Id. The protocol was first rejected by the IRB because of concerns that there
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tie Times, various entities were to blame. It condemned the principal in-
vestigators who ignored the mortality rates that exceeded conventional
203treatment. It explained that perhaps the investigators and Fred Hut-
chinson were motivated by their own financial interests in Genetic Sys-
tems, a company that held a financial stake in the antibodies developed
to diagnose or treat infectious disease and cancer. 204 This information
was not revealed to the patients or the IRB. 205 Though the IRB inquired
into the possible financial conflicts of interests among the researchers
with a financial stake in the success of the protocol, the researchers de-
nied the conflict and the IRB failed to pursue a fuller investigation. °6
More revealing of systemic failure, the Seattle Times blamed the center's
IRB as well as the external agencies tasked with oversight of the study.2 °7
These entities allegedly failed in their singular responsibility to protect
the human subjects from ill-conceived or unreasonably dangerous ex-
208perimentation. Moreover, Fred Hutchinson's IRB allegedly failed to
exercise independent leadership and oversight, and thereby failed to per-
form the duties mandated by federal law. 20 9 For example, the Seattle
Times pointed to instances where the IRB's concerns were ignored,2 0 it
had been inadequate animal studies, that the subject population was actually among a group that
was not at great risk for GVHD and would enjoy a more favorable outcome under conventional
treatment than others, the lack of FDA approval for the use of the experimental agent, and inade-
quate warning in the informed consent about survival statistics for GVHD generally. Id. These
concerns were not addressed and the protocol was approved with different reviewers at a subse-
quent meeting. Id.
As the study progressed, one of the antibodies became associated with unexpected new
cancers in subjects and the subject participants had a higher rejection and recurrent malignancy
rate than did conventional patients. Id. By 1984, researchers acknowledged an unusually high graft
failure rate in their study subjects, but they did not end the trial, even though, at their own institu-
tion, other clinical trials with untreated marrow were enjoying better and better success rates.
SEATTLE TIMES, Blood Cancer Experiment, supra note 201. In fact, as the failures mounted, the
IRB approved Protocol 126 changes, even though each yielded no better result. Id. Furthermore,
mounting evidence suggested that with Protocol 126 the "relapse risk 2.5 years post-transplant was
100 percent ... as compared with 25 percent in patients administered unmodified marrow." Id. In
sum, "the experiment was almost uniformly fatal." Id.
The experiment quietly ended in 1993 and the results were never reported. Id. The story
came to light through the tenacious efforts of Dr. John Pesando, a former employee and physician,
who over two decades first complained from within and then later wrote endless letters to federal
and state agencies and the media trying to get someone to take notice that human subjects were
dying needlessly with little success until the Seattle Times took up the story in 2001. SEATTLE
TiMES, The Whistleblower, supra note 201.
203. SEATTLE TiMES, Blood Cancer Experiment, supra note 201.
204. SEATTLE TIMES, The Whistleblower, supra note 201.
205. SEATTLE TIMES, Blood Cancer Experiment, supra note 201.
206. Id. In fact, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center promulgated a conflict of interest policy in
1983, which, after examining filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Seattle
Times reported were violated. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. SEATTLE TIMES, Blood Cancer Experiment, supra note 201.
210. Id. For example, the initial protocol was rejected but was resubmitted and subsequently
approved without addressing the detailed criticisms that the first IRB raised. Id. The IRB ques-
tioned the controls on antibody use, especially whether there had been adequate animal testing
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approved protocol changes with only a perfunctory review, and most
alarmingly, where the criticism voiced by IRB members within the insti-
tution was chilled through intimidation. 2"' The lead researcher chastised
the IRB when he stated that in addition to the IRB members' responsibil-
ity to review the ethical considerations of the study, they were also re-
quired to assist the researchers and not hinder the research. 212 As a result
of these alleged deficiencies, the families of the subjects who died filed a
class action lawsuit which is currently pending . 3
Recently, the University of Pennsylvania also became embroiled in a
public controversy arising out of human subject experimentation. In Sep-
tember 1999, eighteen-year-old Jesse Gelsinger died while participating
in a University of Pennsylvania Phase I clinical trial testing a new gene
therapy treatment for ornithine transcarbamylase ("OTC") deficiency, a
rare, genetic liver disorder.2t 4 Although many individuals with OTC die
in infancy, Gelsinger, suffering from a milder form, was able to manage
it with a low protein diet supplemented by medication.215 Gelsinger's
physicians recommended the gene therapy trial conducted at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, and eight days after the infusion of a genetically
altered virus by the researchers, Gelsinger died.2t 6 His father reported
that he and his son believed that the experimental procedures offered
therapeutic potential.2t 7 In the words of one commentator, however,
without effect. Id. In 1983-84, the IRB was particularly active in voicing concern and trying to get
answers. The IRB asked to set up an independent review "to consider the merits of all the mono-
clonal antibodies under study" and sought guidance from the National Institute of Health to no
avail. Id. The center refused to initiate an outside review. SEATTLE TIMES, Blood Cancer Experi-
ment, supra note 20 1.
211. SEATTLE TIMES, Blood Cancer Experiment, supra note 201 (explaining that IRB members
"felt unable to do a proper scientific assessment of Protocol 126. They didn't have the information
or the power to their job"). One victory for the IRB was to effect a change in the protocol so that
that the "lowest risk patients"-those who enjoyed a good survival chance with other therapy-
were excluded from the study. Id.
212. Id.
213. Lorraine Anastasia Lezama, Research Guidelines: Lawsuit Filed Against Cancer Center,
29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 231, 231-32 (2001) (describing the allegations). The class action suit was
filed by the law offices of Sherman, Silverstein, Kohl, Rose & Podolsky, which is the same firm
that represented Jesse Gelsinger's estate in the suit against the University of Pennsylvania. Class
Action Suit Against Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center Sends Shock Waves Through Clinical Trials
Community, available at http://www.sskrplaw.com/publications/0 10412.html.
214. See generally Anderlik & Elster, supra note I, at 220-21 (describing and discussing the
protocol); Barker, supra note 136, at 615-19 (same).
215. Barker, supra note 136, at 616.
216. A number of sources detail the experiment and his death. See, e.g.. Barker, supra note
136, at 615-17; Tim Beardsley, Gene Therapy Setback, ScI. AM. (Feb. 2000), available at
http://www.sciam.com/2000/0200issue/0200techbus5.html; Michael Baram, Making Clinical Trials
Safer for Human Subjects, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 253, 255-57 (2001); Sherman, Silverstein, Kohl,
Rose & Podolsky Law Offices, Jesse's Intent, available at
http://www.sskrplaw.com/gene/jessieintent.html (last visited June 14, 2002) (providing Gelsinger's
father's description of his son's decision to enter the study and following him through his last
days).
217. Barker, supra note 136, at 619. This is borne out by the determination letter issued by
OHRP, which stated that OHRP was concerned that the informed consent documents reviewed and
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"there was virtually no chance that the experiment-which researchers
insisted on calling a therapy trial-would provide him with any thera-
peutic benefit., 218 The study intended to evaluate the safety of the proce-
dure, rather than the treatment's effectiveness. 2'9 The possibility of im-
provement from this study was overstated, whereas the risks were under-
stated in the consent form.2 Moreover, the Gelsingers were not in-
formed that "at the time the study commenced, in more than 390 clinical
trials of gene therapy in the last decade, no one had ever been cured,, 22'
and in addition, the consent form failed to "disclose that in earlier ver-
sions of the same experiments on monkeys, the monkeys had died.,
222
Reportedly, evidence suggested that there were earlier problems and
that the studies were not yielding favorable results. Of the seventeen pa-
tients treated prior to Gelsinger, only three showed any sign of improve-
ment or benefit.223 Moreover, the virus given to Gelsinger "spread far
beyond his liver, where it was supposed to correct the defect in his cells.
Within the liver it had bound to immune cells far more than to the hepa-
tocytes it was meant to target., 224 In addition, Gelsinger's attorneys al-
leged that the researchers may have had substantial conflicts of interest
due to their financial interests in the company that owned the product
being tested.225 These interests went undisclosed to the participants in the
approved by the IRB for the OTCD study may have failed to address several elements such as an
explanation of the purposes of the research. University of Pennsylvania Determination Letter, May
7, 2001, 3-4, available at http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/detrm_letrs/may0la.pdf. [hereinafter Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, Determination Letter]. The consent documents' language suggests that
"the investigators knew what would happen in the trial." Id. at 4. Finally, "the informed consent
documents refer to it as 'therapy' when there [was] no knowledge that this Phase I trial would be
therapeutic." Id.
218. Barker, supra note 136, at 616; see also University of Pennsylvania, Determination Let-
ter, supra note 217, at 4.
219. Barker, supra note 136, at 616.
220. The Determination Letter commented:
The informed consent document stated "by giving the virus directly into the right
side of the liver, we hope to obtain the maximal effect of the gene in the liver and to
keep to a minimum any exposure of left-sided liver cells and non-liver cells to the
virus." There was no evidence from animal studies that this was the case. The re-
vised grant application submitted to FDA in March of 1998 stated that biopsies of
baboons transduced with the second generation vector via the hepatic artery showed
liver toxicity in the targeted and non-targeted lobes of the liver.
University of Pennsylvania, Determination Letter, supra note 217, at 4.
221. Barker, supra note 136, at 616-17.
222. Id. at 617.
223. Beardsley, supra note 216.
224. Id., see also Barker, supra note 136, at 617 ("When four other patients in the trial experi-
enced elevated liver enzymes, the researchers should have stopped the trial immediately, notified
both the University's Institutional Review Board and two federal regulatory agencies, and revised
the consent form.").
225. Gelsinger v. University of Pennsylvania, Complaint, available at
http://www.sskrplaw.comllinks/healthcare2.html (last visited June 14, 2002); see also Anderlik &
Eisler, supra note I, at 220; Frances H. Miller, Trusting Doctors: Tricky Business When It Comes
to Clinical Research, 81 B.U. L. REV. 423, 426 (2001).
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study.226
The University of Pennsylvania launched an extensive, independent
evaluation of its gene therapy and human subject research procedures.227
In addition, it voluntarily instituted reforms.228 For example, the Univer-
sity decided to review and strengthen its IRB system, and in particular, it
created an IRB consisting of members with special expertise to evaluate
gene therapy protocols.229 Following an investigation, the Office for Hu-
man Research Protections issued a determination letter to the University
of Pennsylvania. 230 The letter criticized the manner in which the research
was conducted, focusing on deviations from the protocol's exclusion
criteria, the failure to promptly report adverse events, and the modifica-
tion of the protocol without prior IRB approval.23' It also raised issues
concerning particular IRB deficiencies, including a lack of sufficient
information when reviewing a protocol revision, approval of an inade-
quate informed consent document which erroneously implied that the
study and procedures were therapeutic, failure to require amendments to
the consent form to comply with the revisions in the protocol, and the
inadequate description of the foreseeable risks in light of prior animal
studies. 32
Gelsinger's estate filed suit against the researchers, the university
and its officials, including the bioethicist who advised the project.233 The
suit alleged that the researchers failed to obtain informed consent, con-
cealed prior adverse events, and failed to disclose that the institution and
the director of the gene therapy institute would profit from the school's
discovery because both had a financial interest in the company that spon-
sored the gene research.234 The Gelsinger family settled the suit with the
226. Gelsinger Complaint, supra note 225.
227. See The Institute for Human Gene Therapy, University of Pennsylvania Announces Ac-
tions, available at http://www.uphs.upenn.edu/ihgt/upennacts.html (May 24, 2001 ).
228. Id. The school commissioned William Danforth to serve as its chair and asked the com-
mittee to recommend actions to increase human subject protection. See Eugene Russo, Penn Re-
structures Gene Therapy Institute, THE SCIENTIST, (June 12, 2000), available at
http://www.the-scientist.com/yr2000/jun/russop l2000612.html.
229. See supra note 227.
230. See University of Pennsylvania, Determination Letter, supra note 217.
231. Id. at 2-7.
232. Id.
233. Anderlik & Elster, supra note I, at 220. Notably, the bioethicist, Caplan, advised re-
searchers that it would be unethical to perform the experiments on terminally ill infants because
neither they nor their distraught parents could give adequate informed consent. Arthur Allen, Bio-
ethics Comes of Age, SALON MAGAZINE, Sept. 28, 2001, available at
http://www.salon.com/health/feature/2000/09/28/caplan/indexl.html. Thus, the research emphasis
switched to adults who, like Gelsinger, were not as sick. Id. That decision drew criticism. One
commentator criticized that Caplan's advice may meet the criteria of informed consent, but it defies
common sense. Id. "When you're about to test a speculative and potentially dangerous medical
intervention, you try to do it on people who are unlikely to be worse off than if they hadn't under-
gone the intervention." Id. The experiment should have been conducted on terminally ill babies,
not Gelsinger, who had his condition under control before entering the trial. Id.
234. See Gelsinger Complaint, supra note 225.
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University of Pennsylvania.235
On June 3, 2001, Ellen Roche, a healthy volunteer, died following
her participation in an asthma study conducted by Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity. 236 As a participant in the study, Roche inhaled hexamethonium, a
substance that has not been "approved by the FDA for use in humans,
and has never been approved by the FDA for administration via inhala-
tion., 237 The ensuing federal investigation required Johns Hopkins to
immediately suspend all federally funded research, with limited excep-
tions, until specific corrective actions were taken.238
As with the Protocol 126 and Gelsinger incidents, critics claimed the
IRB was partly responsible.239 The determination letter issued by the
OHRP noted the IRB's failure to adequately review the experiment, and
particularly to evaluate the use of hexamethonium. 240 The IRB neglected
to acquire literature, "available [through] routine MEDLINE and Internet
database searches," on the known lung toxicity of hexamethonium. 2 4 ' It
also "failed to obtain sufficient information regarding the source, purity,
quality, and method of preparation and delivery of the hexamethonium
used in the research., 242 OHRP also criticized the IRB's approval of an
informed consent document that, among other shortcomings, "failed to
adequately describe the research procedures" and the "reasonably fore-
seeable risks and discomforts.2 4 3 Remarkably, OHRP also determined
that the IRB neglected to review research at a convened meeting.
244
External reviewers commissioned by Johns Hopkins following
Roche's death were highly critical of the institution's IRB system as
well.2 45 The external review committee opined that without primary re-
235. See Rick Weiss & Deborah Nelson, Penn Settles Gene Therapy Suit, WASH. POST, Nov. 4,
2000, at A4.
236. Lezama, supra note 213, at 11l; Edith Nichols, Dark Days at Hopkins, HOPKINS MEDI-
CAL NEWS (Fall 2001), available at http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/hmn/FOI/cnews.html (last
visited June 14, 2002). A comprehensive set of documents, including the protocol, correspondence,
and critical findings of an external review committee set up in its aftermath are available at
http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/researchvolunteerdeath.html. These facts are drawn from the July
19, 2001 Division of Compliance Oversight, Department of Health and Human Services, Determi-
nation Letter, available at http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/detrmletrs/jul0la.pdf [hereinafter Johns
Hopkins, Determination Letter].
237. Johns Hopkins, Determination Letter, supra note 236, at 2.
238. Id. at 10.
239. See id. at 2-4. The researchers' failures were also noted, including failure to promptly
report unanticipated problems, using an unapproved drug, and deviating from the protocol without
informing the IRB. Id.
240. Id. at 2.
241. Johns Hopkins, Determination Letter, supra note 236, at 2.
242. Id. at 3.
243. Id. at 4.
244. Id. at 3. OHRP determined that "[most protocols are neither individually presented nor
discussed at a convened meeting of any IRB." Id. at 5.
245. Letter from Samuel Hellman, Chair, External Review Committee, to William R. Brody,
President, Johns Hopkins University (August 8, 2001), available at
http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/extemal.pdf.
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viewers, the IRB could not be assured that any member thoroughly re-
viewed protocols. 246 Moreover, it concluded that the Johns Hopkins sys-
tem "limits, by its design, active discussion by the full committee, and
loses the expertise that committee members bring to review. 247 It chas-
tised the committee for not transcribing minutes for the previous eight-
een months.248 Of Johns Hopkins arrogance, they wrote, "In spite of the
previous review by OHRP whose conclusions mirrored many of our con-
cerns, Johns Hopkins vigorously defended the current practices during
our visit. ' 24 9 They criticized an institutional culture that viewed oversight
and review as impediments to research. 5 ° Of the IRB generally, the ex-
ternal committee wrote:
The protocol review process is grossly inadequate and does not
conform to current standards. Most importantly, there is no re-
quired discussion by the whole IRB of each proposal. Indeed,
there was no such discussion of Dr. Togias' proposal. The min-
utes were not transcribed in a timely fashion so as to permit their
use in preparing the letter to the P1. At the time of the writing of
this report they are still not available.25'
In response to the findings by OHRP and the external reviewers, in
February 2002, Johns Hopkins published what OHRP described as "an
honest and insightful examination [that] is very useful to share with the
entire research community, as it sends an important message about
changing institutional culture in protecting human research subjects., 252
Johns Hopkins acknowledged the former deficiencies in the IRB system,
including an inhuman workload, an eighteen-month backlog in transcrip-
tion of IRB minutes, its absence of serious discussion in IRB meetings
about protocols, and a lack of focus on ethics.25 3 The article also detailed
broad reforms aimed at creating cultural change that engages researchers
as well as the entire institution in thoughtful ethical evaluation of re-
search projects. 25 4 Johns Hopkins also explained that it intended to in-
crease the number of IRBs as well as the resources for IRB review, en-
gage in extensive training for researchers and IRB members, and impose
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See supra note 245.
251. Id.
252. Email from OHRP (on file with the author) (acknowledging the Johns Hopkins article and
encouraging it to be widely disseminated and recommended to the entire research community).
253. See Dale Keiger & Sue De Pasquale, Trials and Tribulations, JOHNS HOPKINS MAGAZINE,
Feb. 2002, available at http://www.jhu.edu/-jhumag/0202web/trials.html.
254. Id.
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penalties on those who fail to comply with the system. 2"
V. WHY IRBs FAIL TO PROTECT HUMAN SUBJECTS
As many commentators have acknowledged, IRBs are often too
weak, overburdened, ignorant, or conflicted to adequately perform the
important duties assigned to them by the federal system. The weaknesses
in the IRB system are pervasive, and the resulting widely publicized
gaffes should come as no surprise. Importantly, these deficiencies jeop-
ardize the effectiveness of the federal system that relies heavily on IRBs
to safeguard human subject research. Under federal regulations, the
3,000-5,000 local IRBs act as the gatekeepers standing between the re-
searcher and her research.256 Remarkably, in spite of all the elaborate
rules it promulgated, the federal government barely oversees the IRB
system in order to ensure that it complies with its regulations.257 Expen-
ditures on human subject protection are woefully inadequate. 8 For ex-
ample, "the National Institutes of Health spent less than 0.5 percent of its
human research budget last year on activities aimed at protecting pa-
tients.,
259
In 1998, the Office of Inspector General issued a comprehensive re-
port warning that "[t]he effectiveness of IRBs is in jeopardy." 260 In par-
ticular, it found that changes in the nature and number of research pro-
posals have strained the IRB system, and thus, they review "too much,
too quickly, with too little expertise., 261 Moreover, the Inspector General
criticized that continuing review of projects is scant, IRB independence
is threatened by conflicts, and members have too little training to per-
form their duties.262 Finally, the Inspector General complained that the
effectiveness of the IRB system has not been subjected to critical evalua-
255. Id.
256. There are approximately 3-5,000 IRBs across the country, in hospitals, universities, state
and federal government agencies, and nonprofit and for-profit entities where research involving
human subjects occurs. See Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector Gen-
eral, Institutional Review Boards: Their Role in Reviewing Approved Research, 3, available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/a273.pdf (June 1998) [hereinafter Inspector General, Reviewing
Approved Research].
257. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.103 (5); Goldner, supra note 175, at 99-100 ("Apart from this negoti-
ated assurance process and these requirements for reporting violations, there is no other formal
mechanism whereby the activities of IRBs are in any way monitored by the federal government.");
Inspector General, Reviewing Approved Research, supra note 256, at iii ("The OPRR Oversight
focuses on upfront assurances. Only rarely does its oversight involve on-site assessments of IRB
performance.").
258. Jacob M. Appel, Research Guidelines: Changes Urged, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 103, 104
(2001).
259. Id. (noting similarly scant expenditures on human subject protections in the private sec-
tor).
260. Inspector General, Time for Reform, supra note 165, at 4.
261. Id. at 5.
262. Id.
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263tion, and "[t]oo much... attention now focuses on perfunctory review
responsibilities yielding little protective value. 2 6
Without a doubt, IRBs are overworked. Scientists conduct thousands
of studies across the United States at any given time, 26' and researchers
estimate that as many as 19 million individuals participate in human sub-
ject research each year.26 According to the Inspector General, "IRBs
across the country are inundated with protocols," and the workload of the
average IRB has increased to the point that they are unable to provide
meaningful review. 267 As a result, some IRBs provide "only one to two
minutes of review per study., 268 The rule requiring each institution to
review study protocols conducted in its institution, even when the re-
search is being conducted at many research sites, constitutes one source
of overload.269 This process slows research, frustrates researchers, and
unnecessarily taxes an already overburdened IRB system.27° IRBs expend
"scarce resources on reviewing the same protocol that, in some cases, is
being reviewed by hundreds of other IRBs, even when overall design and
methods can only be changed with great difficulty.
271
In addition to being overburdened, IRB members are neither suffi-
ciently trained in the substantive topic of ethical research conducted on
human subjects, including issues of research design and informed con-
sent, nor in the morass of federal requirements that guide the review
272process. 2 Both the Inspector General and the National Bioethics Advi-
sory Commission (NBAC) cited increased need for education of IRB
members and recognized a shared obligation at the federal and at the
institutional level.27 a In its 2001 final report, NBAC explained that
"[d]espite this enduring recognition of the important role of education,
the educational function of the oversight system has been only minimally
implemented through federal programs. 274 This failure to emphasize
263. Id.
264. Id. at 11.
265. See Adil E. Shamoo, Adverse Events Reporting-The Tip of an Iceberg, 8
ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESEARCH 197, 206 (2001) [hereinafter Shamoo, Adverse Events Reporting].
The National Institute of Health alone funded over 4,000 clinical trials and other research projects
in 1997. Id. Johns Hopkins acknowledged that its two IRBs were reviewing approximately 80
protocols per month of "30 to 90 pages of highly technical material" and that "the volume of pro-
tocols overwhelmed the system." Keiger & De Pasquale, supra note 253.
266. Shamoo, Adverse Events Reporting, supra note 265, at 207. That number includes the 7
million known human subjects participating in National Institute of Health (NIH) funded studies as
well as other governmental agencies funding human subject research and private research con-
ducted by pharmaceutical companies and others. Id. at 207-08.
267. Inspector General, Time for Reform, supra note 165, at 5.
268. Id.
269. See id. at 10.
270. NBAC, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note II, at 117.
271. Id. at 118.
272. See Inspector General, Time for Reform, supra note 165, at 8.
273. Id.; see also NBAC, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note II, at 45-46.
274. NBAC, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note II, at 46.
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education "at the federal level was repeated at the local level, with insti-
tutions often failing to provide educational programs to their investiga-
tors, research staff, and IRB members., 275 According to a 1995 survey,
one-quarter of IRBs at universities "offered no training at all to their
members" and a "vast majority" offered fewer than four hours of training
to IRB members.276 This lack of training constitutes a fundamental flaw
and is problematic because it "impedes [independent IRB members']
ability to serve as an effective counterbalance to institutional and scien-
tific interests. 277
IRB education in ethics is particularly essential because there is no
assurance that principal investigators and scientists have necessarily re-
ceived training on ethical human subject research. In October 2000, for
the first time, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) instituted a rule
requiring all investigators submitting NIH applications to receive educa-
tion in human subject protection.278 Although institutions may develop
their own training programs, the NIH facilitates education by offering an
online tutorial, initially developed for the NIH staff.279 Aside from that
development, one cannot assume that the thousands of researchers in a
variety of academic fields have received any training in the ethics of hu-
man subject research in the course of their education or otherwise.
The federal system is complex and this complexity presents its own
obstacles to meaningful review.28° In addition to the actual regulations,
there are dozens of Dear Colleague letters
28
' and Guidance Letters 2 2
covering topics ranging from the circumstances under which an IRB can
convene a meeting by telephone,283 to how an IRB can ensure informed
consent to the non-English speaking subjects.284 IRBs are also required to
275. Id. NBAC noted that a lack of knowledge about procedures and ethical principles were
chief among the deficiencies identified in audits and suspensions and further commented that IRB
chairs and members strongly supported increased education. Id.
276. Inspector General, Time for Reform, supra note 165, at 8 (citing Gregory J. Hayes et al., A
Survey of University Institutional Review Boards: Characteristics, Policies. and Procedures, IRB,
May-June 1995, at 1-6).
277. Id.
278. See National Institutes of Health, Required Education in the Protection of Human Re-
search Participants, (June 5, 2000 as revised August 25, 2000), available at
http://grants I.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-00-039.html (last visited June 14, 2002).
279. Id. The tutorial is available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/irbcbt/ (last visited June 14, 2002);
see also National Institutes of Health, Office of Extramural Research, Frequently Asked Questions
for the Requirement for Education on the Protection of Human Subjects, available at
http://grants2.nih.gov/grants/policy/hseduc_faq .htm (last modified May 8, 2002).
280. NBAC, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note I1, at 14.
281. Office for Human Research Protections, Department of Health and Human Services,
available at http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/dearcoll.htm (last modified June 21, 2001).
282. Office for Human Research Protections, Department of Health and Human Services,
available at http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/g-topics.htm (last modified May 3, 2002).
283. Office for Human Research Protections, Department of Health and Human Services,
available at http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/references/irbtel.pdf (Mar. 28, 2000).
284. Office for Human Research Protections, Department of Health and Human Services,
available at http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/humansubjects/guidance/ic-non-e.htm (Nov. 9, 1995).
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understand the significant differences between provisions mandated by
the Food and Drug Administration, NIH, and the Department of Human
285of+Services. As a result of the extensive list of rules, it is not uncommon
for IRBs to miscalculate the complexities of the federal regulations.
Overwork has also resulted in IRB failure to adequately fulfill the
continuing review obligations. As a result of the increased workload,
IRBs have become preoccupied with form over substantively meaningful
review of initial protocols, adverse events, and continuing reviews.286 As
one critic stated, "IRBs are spending too much time editing informed-
consent forms and too little time analyzing the risks and potential bene-
fits posed by research. 287 In fact, it is widely known that IRBs have long
neglected continuing review obligations. Federal regulations require
IRBs to undertake continuing review of ongoing research projects at least
annually.288 As the Inspector General noted, however, "[m]any IRBs find
that with significant increases in the quantity of new research protocols,
they have little time left for annual reviews," and they have focused
"much more on complying with procedural requirements than on con-
ducting substantive continuing review. 289
One facet of continuing review that is often neglected concerns ad-
verse events. Researchers conducting studies with federal support must
290
report adverse events to their own IRB and to the federal government.
In spite of this reporting requirement, it is impossible to obtain an accu-
rate count of the number of human subjects that suffer from adverse
events each year as a result of their participation in research. One reason
the extent of adverse events is unknown is that some research is not sub-
ject to federal reporting requirements at all.29' Underreporting is also a
285. See Stuart L. Nightingale, Challenges in Human Subject Protection, 50 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 493, 499-500 (1995) (discussing IRB difficulties in understanding competing and differing
regulations).
286. Inspector General, Time for Reform, supra note 165, at 6 (describing a typical IRB agenda
as covering 18 initial reviews, 9 expedited reviews, 43 protocol amendments, and 21 adverse-event
reports in a 2 '/ hour meeting). NBAC wrote:
The quality of IRB review is often compromised by the burden of excessive paper-
work, because although IRBs are broadly charged with ethical review, in practice
they also must fulfill many procedural requirements. While some of these require-
ments are designed to ensure compliance with ethical standards . . . others appear to
have little relevance to ethical standards of protection of participants .... In all of
their deliberations, IRBs must keep track of a range of detailed regulations and
document the grounds on which they make their decisions in accordance with them.
NBAC, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note I1, at 13-14.
287. Weijer, supra note 62, at 344. Weijer further notes that the research literature reflects this
preoccupation with the consent form and lack of attention to meaningful review of the research
design.
288. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(e) ("An IRB shall conduct continuing review of research covered by
this policy at intervals appropriate to the degree of risk, but not less than once per year, and shall
have authority to observe or have a third party observe the consent process and research.").
289. Inspector General, Reviewing Approved Research, supra note 256, at 7.
290. Shamoo, Adverse Events Reporting, supra note 265, at 199.
291. Id. at 201-02.
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problem. Studies indicate that tens of thousands of adverse events as well
as thousands of deaths are unreported in violation of federal law.2 92 For
example, discussing gene therapy, one commentator wryly noted that:
In the past year, researchers in the United States have been
"catching up" on their reporting to regulators, and it now appears
that at least 691 serious side effects-ranging from high fevers to
serious infections and even seizures-have been experienced by
experimental subjects in U.S. gene therapy trials using modified
adenovirus vectors. Researchers claim that most of these side ef-
fects were caused by the subjects' underlying medical conditions,
and undoubtedly this is so. Still, of the 691 serious side effects,
only thirty-nine were reported-as regulations require-when
they happened. The others were reported in the wake of Pennsyl-
vania's program shutting down, no doubt because of fear of the
same fate. More than 500 serious side effects were reported just
this year, of which 130 occurred in the year 2000. This represents
a noncompliance rate of five percent, or put another way, a rate
of failure to comply almost ninety-five percent.293
Significantly, the adverse effects of hexamethonium on Ellen Roche
were not promptly reported,294 adverse events prior to Gelsinger's death
went unreported, 295 and reports on adverse effects on Protocol 126 were
allegedly delayed. 96
As NBAC dolefully noted, even when adverse events are reported,
IRB review is a woefully ineffective mechanism for monitoring adverse
events.297 Upon receiving an adverse event report, local IRBs are unable
to "determine whether the event is frequent or rare, whether it is caused
by their research as opposed to the underlying illness or standard treat-
ment, or whether the adverse event is more common in the intervention
group than in the control groups." 298 It is nearly impossible for a com-
mittee to discern the significance of adverse events reported to the IRBs
across the nation. In essence, it is like "looking for a needle in a hay-
stack., 299 Because they lack access to the necessary information needed
292. Id. at 214. Dr. Adil Shamoo developed these estimates by examining the number and
nature of reported adverse events and deaths in clinical trials and comparing this number with the
number of reportable events such as suicide and medical error rates that would predictably occur.
Id. at 201-I1. He concluded that the disparity suggests that "the overall reporting of adverse events
... lacks any credibility." Id. at 213.
293. Barker, supra note 136, at 618; see also Baram, supra note 216, at 280 (noting the flood
of reporting activity following Gelsinger's death and identifying reasons for underreporting).
294. See Johns Hopkins, Determination Letter, supra note 236, at 4.
295. Id. at 2-3; Weiss & Nelson, supra note 235.
296. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
297. NBAC, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note II, at 114-15.
298. Id.
299. Inspector General, Reviewing Approved Research, supra note 256, at 7.
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to evaluate these reports, local IRBs are "not only wasting time attempt-
ing to analyze them but are also unable to make use of the data."300
According to the Inspector General, similar to "the continuing review
requirement, the Federal intent [underlying the reporting of adverse
events requirement] was to foster substantive review. But here, too, the
reality has been quite different. 0'0° Fearing exposure to liability, spon-
sors have been increasingly likely to report.30 2 As a result, IRBs have
become inundated with adverse event reports.30 3 In response to these and
other gaps in safety monitoring, in 1998 NIH began to require its grant-
ees to design and establish "Data Safety Monitoring Boards" for their
clinical trials and to submit a data safety monitoring plan with each
grant.3°4 These boards have duties distinct from the IRB and involve
oversight and monitoring activities as they were intended to supplement,
rather than supplant, the IRB system.30 5
The IRB system also suffers from more basic, systemic flaws that
cannot be cured by simply easing workloads, fostering more diligence,
and educating IRB members. These flaws spring from the interests, bi-
ases, and conflicts board members bring with them. Many critics have
noted conflicts of interest among researchers, the institution, and IRB
members.30 6 Those related to the IRB may be the most pernicious be-
cause they are more subtle and less easy to cure by regulation and disclo-
sure than the more obvious financial conflicts that taint the institution
and its researchers. In suggesting that the IRB may not be the appropriate
body to perform continuing reviews, the Inspector General astutely noted
that "[t]he IRB process is rooted in trust,, 30 7 and as a result, it reviews
300. NBAC, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note 11, at 114-15.
301. Inspector General, Reviewing Approved Research, supra note 256, at 7.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. See NIH Policy for Data and Safety Monitoring, (June 10, 1998), available at
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/not98-084.html; Further Guidance on a Data and
Safety Monitoring for Phase I and Phase II Trials, (June 5, 2000), available at
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-00-038.html; National Institutes of Health,
Guidance on Reporting Adverse Events to Institutional Review Boards for NIH-Supported Multi-
center Clinical Trials, (June II, 1999), available at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-
files/not99-107.html [hereinafter Guidance on Reporting].
305. Guidance on Reporting, supra note 304.
306. See, e.g., Baram, supra note 216, at 269-72 (discussing institutional and researcher con-
flicts); Jesse A. Goldner, Dealing With Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: IRB Over-
sight as the Next Best Solution to the Abolitionist Approach, 28 SYMP. J.L. MED. & ETHICS, 379,
381 (2000) (advocating that IRBs should monitor researcher and institutional conflicts of interest);
Peter J. Harrington, Faculty Conflicts of Interest in an Age of Academic Entreprenuerialism: An
Analysis of the Problem. the Law and Selected University Policies, 27 J.C. & U.L. 775, 782-83
(2001) (discussing researcher financial conflicts in medical research); Miller, supra note 225, at
431-39 (discussing researcher conflicts of interest). Universities are becoming increasingly entre-
preneurial, teaming with private biotech companies and patenting their discoveries. See Zinner,
supra note 177 (noting changes in federal law that allow universities to apply for patents developed
through federally funded research and resulting academic-private partnerships).
307. Inspector General, Reviewing Approved Research, supra note 256, at 12.
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protocols "in a collegial manner assuming the best of intentions on the
part of researchers and sponsors."3 °8 In fact, IRBs eschew the "watch-
dog" role in favor of mutual trust, which "inhibits effective continuing
review. ,, °
An additional problem plaguing the IRB system results from the fact
that typically the membership is dominated by scientists, and therefore,
the IRB has an inherent "systematic bias which favors the conduct of
research.310 Current regulations require these bodies to consist of only
one member who is unaffiliated with the institution, and one who is not
involved in the sciences.3 1 1 No doubt there are competing values at stake
in human subject research.312 The federal government invests in research
because of society's core belief in the value of scientific research and
discovery.313 On the other hand, the federal government established the
IRB system because it recognized a paramount need to protect human
subjects from scientific research abuses.3 14 By staffing the IRBs primar-
ily with scientists, the government has failed to mitigate the natural bias
of scientists and to accomplish the goals underlying the system.1t
Because an IRB is charged under federal law with protecting human
subjects, and yet established to facilitate research at its institution, the
board can succumb to conflicts and bias inherent from the outset. In or-
der to obtain federal research money, institutions convene IRBs, and
while the board's purpose is to protect human subjects, it is inescapable
that the institution's objective is to comply with federal regulations so to
obtain funding.
316
Collegiality and institutional loyalty may inhibit IRBs from conduct-
ing thorough and independent reviews of protocols. 1 7 Most IRB mem-
bers are employed as faculty or researchers at the institutions to which
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Goldner. supra note 175, at 106; see also Keiger & De Pasquale, supra note 253 (com-
plaining that boards have too much interest in protecting their own institutions and less in mean-
ingful review).
311. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a). Though only one member is required to be a scientist, members
generally must have "professional competence necessary to review specific research," and as a
result, they become dominated by scientists. Id.
312. Goldner, supra note 175, at 106.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 107.
316. NBAC, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note I1, at 61. NBAC explained:
Because most institutions have an understandable desire to increase their research
activities, institutional IRBs may, themselves, face conflicts of interest. And, even
independent IRBs have a strong incentive to consider the interests of their institu-
tional contractors.... Some have suggested that the primary function of IRBs has
shifted from protecting the participant to protecting the institution.
Id.
317. Katz, supra note 165, at 40-41.
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the investigators belong.318 These members realize "when sitting in
judgment of a research protocol, that their proposals may soon be sub-
jected to similar scrutiny., 319 As a result, "it is unlikely that members of
IRBs will hold investigators to a standard of disclosure and consent that
would protect the subjects of research if doing so would place impedi-
ments on the conduct of research and, in turn, affect the well-being of
their colleagues in decisive ways. 32°
In addition to a collegial reticence to disapprove another researcher's
experiments, there may also be outright intimidation and retaliation. 32'
For example, in Protocol 126, comments by IRB members complaining
about the progress of the experiment were not well received, and the evi-
dence suggests the members paid a professional price.322 According to
the Seattle Times, "IRB members felt unable to do a proper scientific
assessment of Protocol 126 [and that] they didn't have the information or
the power to do their job. 323
VI. REFORMING THE SYSTEM
The rise of the IRB as the frontline protection of human subjects
principally resulted from federal efforts,324 and reform will have to come
from federal forces as well. In April 2000, the Inspector General issued a
status report on the implementation of its 1998 recommendations.325 Al-
though the report indicated that federal investigation and enforcement
318. 1d.
319. Id. at 41.
320. Id.; see also Inspector General, Time for Reform, supra note 165, at 18 (commenting on
methods to improve the ability of the IRB to act independently without pressure or "regard for
business concerns").
321. See Shamoo, Conflict of Interest, supra note 165, at 207 (quoting 1996 unidentified GAO
report) (noting that IRB employees in the same institution may be compromised by collegial ties
and institutional pressures to attract and retain funding, reluctance to criticize studies by leading
scientists, and their own financial interests in research). In the bleak words of another commenta-
tor:
[Elffective institutional oversight and self-regulation of trial management is highly
dependent on the values and behavior of principal investigators, and the capacity and
diligence of IRBs. Other studies and investigations confirm this and provide addi-
tional evidence of investigator misbehaviors and the ineffectiveness of their IRBs.
As a result, it is now widely accepted that IRBs are overwhelmed by trial oversight
responsibilities and documentation, are easily misled or ignored by researchers, and
are unwilling to challenge institutional colleagues.
Baram, supra note 216, at 267-68.
322. See SEATTLE TIMES, Blood Cancer Experiment, supra note 201. When the IRB initially
questioned conflicts of interest, the researcher responded that the committee members "have not
only an obligation to review ethical aspects of this work, but also an obligation to assist us and not
impede our research." Id.
323. Id.
324. LEVINE, supra note 200, at 322 (explaining that "[tlhe first federal document requiring
committee review" was promulgated in the 1950s and applied to intramural research at NIH).
325. See generally Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Inspector General,
Protecting Human Research Subjects. Status of Recommendations (Apr. 2000), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/a447.pdf.
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activity had increased, few of the reforms had been enacted.326 The par-
ticular reforms that had not been implemented included increased IRB
flexibility, greater IRB accountability for results, strengthened continu-
ing review, enactment of educational requirements, IRB isolation from
conflicts of interest, reduced workloads, and "reengineering the Federal
,,327
oversight process.
Changes, however, may be underway. In 1995, President Clinton es-
tablished the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) to con-
sider the rights of human research subjects and to develop recommenda-
tions to improve the current system. 328 Their final report reflected three
general themes:
First .. . there should be fewer federal regulations and more
guidance. Second, [regulations] generally [should] focus atten-
tion on research for which participants need the most protection
and strive to make the level of protection commensurate with the
level of risk involved in the research .... Third, the recommen-
dations [should] both increase the scope of regulated research
and streamline the process of regulatory compliance.329
Education is one of the cornerstones of NBAC's recommendations.33 °
It recommended partnership between the government, academic institu-
tions, and professional organizations in order to enhance ethics education
among scientists.331 It addition, it also called for formal, mandatory edu-
cation of IRB members, staff, and officials, 332 as well as the demonstra-
tion of individual member competence through certification programs
aligned with federal standards and developed by institutions.333
In order to promote better accountability and training, NBAC also
recommended that the federal government facilitate the development of
accrediting bodies, establish guidelines used to approve those bodies, and
then to encourage institutions to become accredited in order to secure
adherence to federal standards and appropriate oversight.334 Private ac-
creditation by federally approved bodies may establish an effective
method to ensure that the inordinately large and diverse institutions now
326. See generally id.
327. Id. at 3.
328. NBAC, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note I1, at xi. The Committee was estab-
lished by Executive Order 12975 (Oct. 3, 1995) to identify broad principles to govern the ethical
conduct of research and to give advice and recommendation to the National Science and Technol-
ogy Council. Id. at Title Page.
329. Id. at xi.
330. Id. at 45.
331. Id. at 48.
332. NBAC, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note 11, at 48.
333. Id. at 48-49.
334. Id. at 49-50.
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receiving federal funding are prepared and able to protect human sub-
jects."'
Furthermore, NBAC also noted that only a few federal agencies pro-
actively conduct site inspections to ensure institutional compliance with
federal regulations. 336 Most inspections result from reported incidents,
and therefore, they are conducted solely on a "for cause" basis.337 Cur-
rently, there are no regulations requiring institutions and their IRBs to
audit compliance.338 As a result, NBAC recommended the adoption of
'various mechanisms, including assurances of compliance, site inspec-
tions, and internal audits. 339
Of import, there is increasing federal recognition that some entity ex-
ternal to the researcher must monitor compliance and provide oversight
continuously, after approval of the research.340 The scientific community
is divided on whether the IRB is appropriate and able to provide that
oversight.3 4 1 Some of the problems are evident. "Some argue that as col-
legial review boards, IRBs should not question the information provided
by investigators. On the other hand, others have argued that IRBs should
develop mechanisms for continuing review."
342
NBAC also recommended the creation of clearer federal policies de-
fining institutional, IRB, and researcher conflicts. Acknowledging persis-
tent conflicts of interest that inhibit the IRBs' independence,343 NBAC
called for the promulgation of policies by sponsors and institutions to
require disclosure and to manage conflicts of interests.344 In addition, it
also recommended federal policy establishing membership criteria that
ensures competence but also that more strongly represents the partici-
pant's perspectives by increasing unaffiliated IRB membership at least
twenty-five percent.345
NBAC also suggested numerous substantive recommendations con-
cerning benefit identification, risk assessment, vulnerability of popula-
tions, informed consent and privacy issues.3 46 It introduced "research
335. Id.
336. See generally id. at 50-53. These include the FDA, which conducted a limited number of
site inspections of IRBs and programs, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Veterans
Affairs. NBAC, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note 11, at 52-53. The Office of Human Re-
search Protections inspects on a "for cause" basis. Id. at 53. OPRR Compliance oversight investi-
gations resulting in restrictions and actions involve many of the most prestigious academic institu-
tions and hospitals in the nation. See id. at 54-56.
337. See 51-56.
338. Id. at 51.
339. NBAC, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note 1I, at 64.
340. See generally id. at 57-64.
341. See id. at 57.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 61.
344. NBAC, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note II, at 64.
345. Id.
346. See generally id. at 69-108.
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equipoise," a term describing "the state in which genuine uncertainty
exists regarding which intervention-experimental or control (including
placebos)-is better., 347 According to NBAC, "[a] judgment of research
equipoise relies on a comparison of the risks and potential benefits of the
proposed study interventions with those of accepted practice" and "re-
quires approximate equality in the relation between the risks and poten-
tial benefits of the study and control interventions. 3 4' Explaining how
IRBs should assess risks and benefits and calculate the risk-benefit ra-
tio, 349 NBAC urged the adoption of a "component analysis" approach.
350
Under this approach, IRBs are required to consider "each component of a
study . . . separately, ' 35I and "potential benefits from one component of a
study should not be used to justify risks posed by a separate component
of a study. 352 This analytic process would have helped the IRB assess
the Kennedy Krieger study, where every child gained some indirect
benefit but risks were variable depending upon the group to which the
child was assigned.353 Finally, it also encouraged IRBs to consider the
vulnerability of particular subjects when balancing the risks and bene-
fits.
354
As the Inspector General earlier noted, NBAC warned that for the
past twenty-five years, oversight through meaningful continuing review
of research projects has been virtually nonexistent.355 It cited overbur-
dened IRBs that are weighed down by the requirement of annual reviews
of all projects regardless of their risk as an impediment to meaningful
review of risky projects.356 Importantly, in order to ease some of that
burden, NBAC concluded that local review is not sacrosanct, especially
in the case of multi-site research.35 7 It recommended that federal policy
347. Id. at 78.
348. Id. (citations and italics omitted).
A variety of intervention-related factors are likely to contribute to the determination
of this assessment, including, among others, the relative efficacy of the intervention,
the probability and magnitude of side effects, ease of administration, and participant
compliance. An experimental intervention may pose greater risk to participants than
accepted practice, as long as it also offers the prospect of greater direct benefit to
the participant and the relation between the risks and potential benefits falls within a
range of equivalency to accepted practice.
NBAC, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note 1I, at 78.
349. Id. at 69-96.
350. Id. at 76.
351. Id. at 77.
352. Id.
353. See NBAC, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note I1, at 76 (describing Weijer's com-
ponent approach). To see the approach taken by Weijer, see Weijer, supra note 62, at 351-52.
354. Id. at 92.
355. Id. at 112.
356. Id. at 112-13.
357. Id. at 14. NBAC explained that multi-site research:
[Hias challenged fundamental assumptions about the importance of local review, for
the more IRBs duplicate each other's work by reviewing the same protocols, the
more pressure there is to show why multiple local reviews of identical research pro-
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allow "central or lead" IRB review to ease the duplicative work within
the current system.35 NBAC noted that accrediting IRBs would ensure
that regional or central IRB review would still be of sufficient quality.359
Moreover, while it acknowledged that there could be a potential loss of
familiarity with local sensitivities and local knowledge without local
review, the federal government should allow IRBs the opportunity to
lessen their own role in multi-site and cooperative research.' This sug-
gestion alone will be applauded by researchers and sponsors who "are
discouraged by having to submit protocols to multiple boards, particu-
larly because changes requested by one board usually have to be ap-
proved by the others, a repetitive process that is labor intensive and that
can significantly delay research, with little resulting benefit.
361
Furthermore, NBAC was also troubled that the current regulations do
not require researchers to provide compensation for research-related in-
juries. 362 Rather, the current regulations merely require the informed con-
sent document to explain whether compensation is available for injuries
and prohibits the use of legal liability waivers. Therefore, the principle
sources of compensation available for injuries resulting from research
injuries are the tort system or the participant's private health insur-
ance.364 NBAC explained that because the public at large reaps the bene-
fits of medical research, it is justifiable to expect the public to fund a
national compensation program.365 NBAC, however, stopped short of
tocols are needed. Although local review can provide insight about the social and
cultural context of a study . . . IRBs may be squandering precious resources when
dozens or hundreds of them must review all aspects of a single, multi-site protocol
when the design and methods are unlikely to be changed.
NBAC, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note I1, at 14.
358. Id. at 122.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 14.
362. NBAC, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note 1I, at 123. It explained that "[flor over
30 years, various parties have discussed alternatives to this option [of resorting to lawsuits for
compensation], and many national panels and advisory groups in the United States have recom-
mended the establishment of a compensation program." Id. at 124. NBAC noted that.the Tuskegee
Syphilis Ad Hoc Advisory Panel recommended establishing a ""no fault' clinical research insur-
ance plan" that would compensate injured research subjects without regard to proof of negligence.
Id. Each proposal has languished and failed. Id.
363. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (prohibiting "any exculpatory language through which the subject or
the representative is made to waive or appear to waive any of the subject's legal rights, or releases
or appears to release the investigator, the sponsor, the institution or its agents from liability for
negligence"). The regulation requires research involving more than minimal risk to provide "an
explanation as to whether any compensation and an explanation as to whether any medical treat-
ments are available if injury occurs." 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(6).
364. NBAC, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note II, at 125. Litigation concerning re-
search injuries reveals that the tort system is inadequate to ensure compensation. Litigation is slow
and costly and these reasons alone make it an ineffective system to compensate injured research
victims. Non-uniform legal standards are applied across jurisdictions. See generally Goldner, supra
note 175, at 70-88 (discussing the effectiveness of the tort system as a normative influence on
ethics in research).
365. NBAC, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note 1I, at 125.
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recommending the creation of a compensation system, and instead, it
urged the establishment of a federally funded program used to study re-
search injuries as well as the implementation of a pilot study to test com-
pensation mechanisms.3
Finally, according to NBAC, the current system contains large and
dangerous gaps that have allowed for a large amount of uncontrolled
research.367 It described the existing system as too inflexible to accom-
modate the variety of research currently conducted and too cumbersome
to "react quickly to new developments. 368 While advocating uniformity
"across all government agencies, academe, and the private sector," it also
called for sufficient flexibility standards "to be applied in widely differ-
ent research settings or to emerging areas of research."' 369 Therefore,
NBAC proposed the creation of an "independent oversight office that
would have clear authority over all other segments of the federal gov-
ernment and extend protections to the entire private sector for both do-
mestic and international research. 37 °
Acknowledging that its proposals would create "additional costs for
institutions, sponsors, and the federal government,, 37' NBAC empha-
sized the importance of reform and called on broad constituencies shar-
ing common interests in reform to work together:
In previous reports, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission
(NBAC) recognized that research should not be thwarted because
resources are not available to provide the necessary protections
for human participants and that compliance would require addi-
tional resources . . . . Sponsors of research, whether public or
private, should work together with institutions conducting re-
search to make the necessary resources available.372
It called for federal appropriations "to carry out the functions of the
proposed federal oversight office." 373 In addition, NBAC explained that
as research is funded, it will contain "a separate allocation for oversight
activities." 374 Finally, it explained that additional federal funding as well
as that obtained through other sources should be made available to local
institutions in order to operate IRBs and conduct oversight activities.375
366. Id. at 126.
367. See id. at 26-28.
368. Id. at vi.
369. Id.
370. NBAC, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note II, at vi.
371. Id. at 131.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 133.
374. Id.
375. NBAC, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note II, at 133.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Congress will soon consider these recommendations in earnest as
bills are on the near horizon to establish a new National Office of Human
Research Protection.376 The current system resulted largely as a response
to past abuses, 377 and predictably, the state of new revelations may even-
tually yield some improvements in a troubled system. The recent deaths
of human subjects participating in research at prestigious institutions
across the nation may provide the necessary impetus for a long-needed
overhaul of the system. 378 It is small consolation to a family member that
someone in his or her family "did not die in vain" and that a person's
death or injury in the name of research sparked constructive reform. With
regard to recent research related injuries and deaths, there may be some
grain of truth to reform springing from the sacrifices of human subjects.
Scandals and abuses in human subject research have traditionally served
as fuel for change in the system our nation employs to protect human
subjects. While no one can dispute the value of human subject research,
history has shown us that we cannot neglect our societal role to oversee
its conduct. The federal government has awakened to the fact that the
current system is outdated, overburdened, and failing to protect subjects
as it was intended. 379 The Inspector General and NBAC report have whet
the desire to change an unwieldy, broken system that cannot keep pace
with the proliferation of research that constantly raises new and difficult
ethical challenges. Importantly, the Kennedy Krieger decision heralds the
arrival of a new player in human subject research oversight. In Grimes,
the court established an important judicial role in articulating standards
for human subject protection. Given the filing of lawsuits across the na-
tion related to human subject research, judges may provide a strong voice
for change in the current deficient system.
376. See National Bioethics Advisory's Swan Song, THE BLUE SHEET, September 5, 2001,
2001 WL 7811664 (reporting that Representatives Diana DeGette and Jim Greenwood will soon
introduce a bill to strengthen human subject research and to establish a National Office for Human
Research Oversight); Diana DeGette, Bioethics Commission to Introduce Patient Protection Bills,
WASHINGTON DRUG LETTER, August 6, 2001,2001 WL 8205327.
377. See, e.g., Childress, supra note 165, at 105-06 (discussing the development of the Na-
tional Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research
("National Commission") in the 1970s to guard against unethical experiments involving human
subjects).
378. See Human Subject Protections Bill Would Create One Federal Oversight Office, THE
BLUE SHEET, August 1, 2001, 2001 WL 7811527 (noting that recent lapses in human subject pro-
tections should serve "'as impetus to pass legislation to improve human subjects protections").
379. See generally NBAC, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note 11.
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